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This dissertation studies decisions pertaining to human capital invest-
ment, specifically education and health. Specifically, I examine human capi-
tal decisions through two key research questions. One, what is the effect of
household structures on decisions pertaining to human capital development of
infants? Two, what is the effect of education policies on education choices?
Chapter 1 of the dissertation examines the former by assessing the role of
grandparents in household decisions, and Chapters 2 and 3 study the latter
question using education policies in India and United States, respectively.
Chapter 1 studies the role of grandparents in healthcare decisions made
for infants. Using a unique research design, I show that a change to household
structure caused by the death of the last living grandparent can be used to
identify the effect of grandparents on household decisions, if one exploits the
variation in the timing of these decisions relative to the death. This chapter
highlights the importance of grandparents in household decisions, especially
vi
in context of technology diffusion and human capital development. It also
makes an important contribution to the literature by offering a novel empirical
strategy that could be used to study the effect of family members on a variety
of outcomes in an extended household setting.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 investigate how education policies affect edu-
cational outcomes of disadvantaged populations. In Chapter 2, I examine the
effects of the world’s largest free lunch program, the Mid Day Meal Scheme
of India. Using an instrumental variable strategy, I explicitly incorporate the
differential implementation levels of the policy across states. The findings of
this paper show that India’s free lunch program increased primary school en-
rollment in India, especially for girls and other disadvantaged populations. In
Chapter 3, I study the effect of education policies on choices of students in
higher education. In particular, I explore the impact of a policy change that
allowed undocumented immigrants to be eligible for in-state tuition in Texas.
Employing a difference-in-differences strategy, I find that the reduced college
costs resulting from the in-state tuition policy decreased the gap in educational
outcomes of undocumented immigrants and their US-born peers. The results
of this chapter suggest that the in-state tuition policy increased the probability
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Chapter 1
Estimating the Role of Grandparents in
Household Decisions
Grandparents play an important role in household decisions. The pres-
ence of grandparents influences household resources such as time endowment
and income, which can have important implications for labor market out-
comes and household production decisions. For instance, studies have found
significant effects of old age pensions earned by grandparents on labor supply,
educational attainment and nutritional outcomes (Duflo 2000, 2003, Bertrand
et al. 2003, Edmonds 2006). Moreover, grandparents often have different ed-
ucation levels and preferences than young parents, which may also influence
household decisions. Although household resource allocation has been studied
extensively (Thomas 1990, Thomas and Chen 1994), very little is known about
the influence of grandparents on household decisions.
Multigenerational families are an important example of a setting in
which grandparents play a crucial role. In the United States, 19 percent of
the population lives in multigenerational families and 10 percent of all chil-
dren under the age of 18 live in the same household as at least one of their
1
grandparents.1,2 These statistics are much higher for developing countries in
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central/South America and the Middle East, where
multigenerational households are more common. For instance, in South Africa,
36 percent of the population and 42 percent of all children live in multigener-
ational households, while in India, 50 percent of all children live in the same
household as their grandparents.3 Given the high prevalence of multigener-
ational households, it is important to examine the role of grandparents in
household decision-making.
I use a novel research design that exploits a change in household struc-
ture caused by the death of the last living grandparent. To examine the role
of grandparents, many existing studies have used variations that are country-
specific (such as old-age pension reforms). The variation used in this paper
offers the advantage of broader applicability because all multigenerational fam-
ilies experience a transition in household structure after the death of the last
living grandparent. A potential concern with using death as a variation is sam-
ple selection. It can be argued that deaths are not randomly distributed, and
the timing of death of a grandparent might be confounded by other socioeco-
nomic characteristics of the household. For instance, poorer families are more
likely to have lower life expectancies and grandparents are likely to die younger
1A multigenerational family in the U.S. is defined as a household that includes two or
more adult generations, or one that includes grandparents and grandchildren.
2Source: Pew Research Centre. Available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/
09/04/children-living-with-or-being-cared-for-by-a-grandparent/
3Source: Social profile of South Africa, 2002-2009 - Statistics South Africa and Global
Perspectives on Multigenerational Households, and District Level Household Survey of India.
2
in poor families than in non-poor families. Using data from India, I show that
the sample selection concerns can be addressed by comparing decisions made
before to those made after the death of a grandparent. This research design
can be used for any decision that a household makes frequently enough to be
observable before and after the death, provided that the household has limited
control over the timing of the decision.
I use data from India to analyze the influence of grandparents on neona-
tal care decisions. Neonatal care is an interesting outcome to illustrate my
research design for two main reasons. First, grandparents play a significant
role in neonatal care decisions. Grandparents typically are very involved in
child care activities, and they are an important source of information for young
mothers (Fikree et al 2001, Mumtaz and Salway 2007). However, they may
have dated information about neonatal care best-practices, which can worsen
a child’s outcomes (Kerr et al. 2008, Aitken et al. 2016). Thus, the effect of
grandparents on neonatal care outcomes is unclear a priori. Second, neonatal
care is extremely important for child survival and human capital development.
One-third of global neonatal deaths can be prevented by good neonatal care
practices such as routine vaccination and early initiation of breastfeeding. In-
dia has a low incidence of good neonatal care practices and accounts for over
26 percent of global neonatal deaths. In this paper, I focus on two neonatal
outcomes (i) an index of three vaccinations that physicians recommend should
be administered at birth and (ii) the probability of feeding colostrum to a new-
3
born.4,5 High prevalence of multigenerational households and low incidence of
good neonatal care practices makes India an interesting setting to study the
role of grandparents on neonatal care decisions. Specifically, I use the variation
in the timing of birth relative to the death of the last living grandparent to
compare neonatal care decisions made for children born after the death with
(i) children born before the death and (ii) children born in families in which
the last living grandparent is alive. This approach enables me to control for
differences across households in which the last living grandparent dies and
households in which s/he is alive. In another specification, I use mother-fixed
effects to separate out any time-invariant mother-specific characteristics and
compare children born within a household.
My findings suggest that the presence of grandparents significantly
worsens the neonatal care provided to newborns. In particular, children born
after the death of the last living grandparent are 4.4-4.9 percentage points
more likely to be immunized at birth and 3.4 percentage points more likely
to be given colostrum.6 These effects translate to a 33-36 percent increase in
the probability of being immunized at birth and a 5.6 percent increase in the
4The three vaccinations are Bacillus CalmetteGurin (BCG), Oral Polio Vaccine (OPV),
and Hepatitis B. The index takes a value of 1 if all three vaccines were given to the child
and 0 otherwise. Details are provided in Section 4.
5Colostrum is the first breast milk produced by the mother after a child is born. It con-
tains antibodies that help protect the newborn against diseases. In many cultures (including
India), colostrum is considered impure (because of its ”thick yellowish” appearance) and it
is not given to newborns.
6The analysis sample includes children born in households in which either a grandparent
is currently living within the household or the last living grandparent died during a three-
year reference period of the survey.
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colostrum outcome. In line with the findings of prior studies, I do not find
any evidence for heterogeneity in results by the sex of the grandchild (Deaton
2003, Barcellos et al. 2015). I also find that the estimates for probability of
immunization are higher in magnitude when a grandmother dies than when
a grandfather dies, but these differences are not statistically significant.7 Ro-
bustness tests show that the estimates are not sensitive to specifications, and
are not driven by direct effects of death such as grief.8 Suggestive evidence
shows that the primary mechanisms driving the results are inter-generational
informational gap and changes in bargaining power resulting from a change
in household structure from a three- to a two-generation household. To sup-
port my empirical results, I present a conceptual framework that shows how
differences in information, beliefs, and bargaining power allocation can affect
household choices across different household structures.
This paper contributes to the literature in three important ways. First,
this is the first paper to use the death of a grandparent to estimate causal
effects of multigenerational households. Studies examining the role of grand-
7The lack of evidence for heterogeneity in results by the gender of the grandparent
could be because of the fact that about 70 percent of the households in the sample had
grandmothers as the last living grandparent.
8To separate the direct effects of death (such as changes in per-capita resources) from
the effects of a change in household structure, I compare the death of the second-to-last
grandparent to the death of the last living grandparent. Note that in case of the death
of the second-to-last grandparent, there is no change in household structure. The findings
suggest that children born after the death of second-to-last grandparent are less likely to
get immunized. However, when the death results in a change in the household structure
(from a three- to a two-generation household), the negative direct effects of the death are
outweighed by the positive effects of the change in household structure.
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parents have primarily used local policy variation to isolate the effect of cash
transfers to grandparents on household decisions (Duflo 2000, 2003, Bertrand
et al. 2003, Case 2004, Edmonds 2006).9 The empirical methodology used in
this paper has the advantage of being applicable to any context with multi-
generational households and can be used to study the role of grandparents
on a variety of outcomes such as nutrition and education. Second, this is the
only paper to have estimated the causal impact of grandparents on immuniza-
tions and breastfeeding practices. The existing evidence on the relationship
between household structure and health outcomes is restricted to qualitative
or correlation analysis (Doan and Bisharat 1990, Dasgupta 1995, Gage et al.
1997, Griffiths et al. 2002, Bronte-Tinkew and Dejong 2005, Kumar and Ram
2013, Allendorf 2013). Third, findings of this paper show that grandparents
are important factors in determining the demand for new health technolo-
gies such as immunization. Some studies have identified lack of information
and socio-cultural factors as reasons for slow uptake of technology innovations
(Rogers 1995, Hall 2004, Geruso and Spears 2015). The findings of this paper
contribute to this literature by showing that the presence of older generations
within a household is another important determinant of the rate of adoption
of critical healthcare practices.
The evidence presented in this paper has important implications for
9Some other studies in sociology and psychology literature have examined the relationship
between grandparents and adolescent grandchildren in developed countries (Matthews and
Sprey 1985, Casper and Bryson 1988, Sands and Goldberg-Glen 2000, Ruiz and Silverstein
2007). But the evidence presented in these studies is not causal.
6
improving policy interventions aimed at reducing neonatal mortality. A re-
cent WHO report emphasizes that preventable infant deaths can be reduced
by raising awareness of neonatal care practices.10 Typically, such strategic
informational interventions are aimed at young parents, in particular, young
mothers. This paper argues that informational interventions for young mothers
may not translate into better neonatal outcomes, if they are not the primary
decision-makers. Given the significant influence of grandparents on critical
healthcare decisions, it is important to include older generations in healthcare
informational interventions. Since India’s neonatal deaths account for over a
quarter of global neonatal deaths, adopting cost-effective interventions to re-
duce Indian child mortality can significantly contribute to the achievement of
global child health goals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 describes the
setting of multigenerational households and neonatal care practices in India.
Section 1.2 presents a conceptual framework. Section 1.3 describes the empir-
ical strategy, followed by a discussion of the data in Section 1.4. Section 1.5
presents the empirical results. Section 1.6 presents the heterogeneity in the es-
timates and robustness checks. Section 1.7 discusses the possible mechanisms





1.1 Multigenerational Households and Neonatal Care
in India
1.1.1 Multigenerational Families in India
In India, multigenerational households are very common and typically
consist of older parents, their sons, unmarried daughters, sons’ wives and their
children (Coffey, Khera and Spears (CKS), 2013).11 Bargaining power within a
multigenerational household is a function of gender and age. Within a house-
hold, young women are subordinate to men and older women.12 Thus, the
presence of grandparents in a household adversely affects young women’s au-
tonomy in household decisions. According to IHDS (2005), 80 percent of In-
dian women between 15-44 years of age reported that they require permission
from other senior members or their husbands to go to a health center. Panel A
of Figure 1.1 shows that households in which the grandparents recently died,
women’s autonomy (measured by their ability to go to a health center with-
out asking permission) is comparable to households in which grandparents are
not permanent residents. In these households, less than 10 percent of women
reported asking permission from a senior member to go to a health facility. As
shown in Figure 1.1, for households in which grandparents are present, over
11Married daughters usually live with their husband’s families. According to the Indian
Human Development Survey (IHDS, 2012), about 98 percent married women indicate that
they moved into the husband’s parents’ house after marriage. Over 64 of percent married
women stated that they were currently living with their parents-in-law or lived with them
until they died.
12In rural India, the status of young women drops drastically upon marriage and it remains
low during the early reproductive years, until they become mothers-in-law (Dasgupta 1995,
Allendorf 2013).
8
50 percent of women reported seeking permission from senior members to go
to a health facility.13 Figure 1.1 highlights the fact that, in rural India, older
household members have a significant influence over young women’s autonomy.
Resource allocation within a household is influenced by the relative
bargaining strengths, information set and preferences of those involved in de-
cision making (Behrman, 1995, 1998). Grandparents are different from young
parents in two main ways. First, in low-income countries, grandparents typi-
cally have less education and less knowledge of healthcare advancements than
young parents (Simkhada, 2010). According to the Indian Human Develop-
ment Survey (IHDS, 2012), only 40 percent of grandfathers and 19 percent
of grandmothers were literate, compared to a literacy rate of 79 percent for
fathers and 61 percent for mothers.14 Second, older generations during their
reproductive years did not have easy access to good healthcare services, which
contributes to their lack of knowledge about the importance, availability and
affordability of healthcare services. Young parents, in contrast, are typically
more educated and have more access to information about healthcare services.
Also, most health awareness campaigns target young women for informational
interventions. Given the generational information and education gap, it is
likely that in families in which grandparents are the decision-makers and in
13In households in which mothers-in-law are present, about 59-65 percent of these women
reported seeking permission from a senior female member or the mother-in-law. If I restrict
the sample to families in which the only senior member is the mother-in-law, the percentage
of women who seek permission from senior members is 64 percent.
14IHDS (2012) suggests that grandfathers and grandmothers had 3 and 1 years of edu-
cation, on average, compared to the average of 7 and 5 years of education of fathers and



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































families that have no grandparents, healthcare decisions will differ.
The association between the multigenerational family structure and
women’s health outcomes has been studied extensively by anthropologists and
demographers (Jeffrey et al. 1989, Dasgupta 1990, 1995, Santow 1995, Barua
and Kurtz 2001, Chorghade et al. 2006, Allendorf 2013). Allendorf (2013), who
studied the effect of household structure on women’s health, found that Indian
women who live in extended families have better maternal health outcomes
than those who live in nuclear families. However, as Allendorf notes, her
analysis is limited because of sample selection and lack of data on transition
of households from an extended to a nuclear family structure. In this paper I
overcome these limitations and extend the literature by using a variation in the
timing of birth relative to the timing of the death of the last living grandparent
to determine how family structure affects the health outcomes of children.
Moreover, I allow for lateral variation in household structure, i.e., my sample
includes households that do and do not have married siblingswhich provides
an additional opportunity to examine the relationship between heterogeneity
in effects by household composition.
1.1.2 Neonatal Care in India
Each year in India 0.748 million babies die within the first month of
birth, accounting for over a quarter of the world’s neonatal deaths.15 One-third
15Source: Unicef India. Available at http://unicef.in/Whatwedo/2/
Neonatal-Health-
11
of newborn deaths in India are caused by neonatal infections which are pre-
ventable by vaccines and initiation of early breastfeeding. Despite large efforts
aimed at achieving universal immunization coverage, the uptake of healthcare
services in India remains low. Table 1.1 shows that 16 percent of the children
who missed immunizations did so due to supply gaps. However, 65 percent of
missed immunizations are attributed to demand-related reasons, with custom-
ary/family constraints and a lack of knowledge as the main causes of missed
immunization. In this paper, I investigate whether the presence of grandpar-
ents contributes to this demand-side gap in neonatal care outcomes for children
in India.
Existing evidence for the relationship between household structure and
children’s health outcomes is limited and ambiguous.16 Some studies have
found no association between household structure and children’s health (Grif-
fiths et al. 2002, Bronte-Tinkew and Dejong 2005), while others have found
that the presence of grandparents is an important determinant of women’s
autonomy and children’s health (Doan and Bisharat 1990, Gage et al. 1997).
Studies that examine the low level of immunization coverage among infants
have found that lack of knowledge, the mother’s autonomy, and education are
important determinants of improved immunization and feeding practices (Ku-
16Various psychology and sociology studies have examined the relationship between grand-
parents and grand-children (Matthews and Sprey 1985, Casper and Bryson 1988, Sands and
Goldberg-Glen 2000, Ruiz and Silverstein 2007). Yet most of this literature studies behavior
of adolescents in developed countries, where role of grandparents and household structures
differ based on the status of parents (divorced or married). In India, divorces are uncommon
and grandparents often have more bargaining power in the intra-household decisions than
parents.
12








Supply Related 15.57 15.28 14.74
Demand Related 64.93 64.46 66.06
Family or Knowledge related 90.01 89.02 91.08
Financial Constraints 1.7 2.2 1.31
Time Constraint 8.29 8.79 7.61
Other 19.50 20.26 19.2
Observations 43,135 1,342 14,404
Notes: All statistics are in percentages. The sample includes married women aged 15-44
who did not have their children immunized. Supply-related reasons include: the place of
immunization is too far, the auxiliary nurse midwife (ANM) is absent, the vaccine is not
available, child were brought but not given immunization, and the waiting time was too
long. Demand-related reasons include: too young to be immunized, unaware of the need
for immunization, fear of side effects, no faith in immunization, mother too busy (time
constraint), family problems, child ill and thus not brought for immunization, financial
constraints, and the child is a girl. The other category includes an unknown place or time of
immunization. This table shows that the majority of children are not immunized because of
demand-related reasons; knowledge constraints are the main demand-related reason given
for not immunizing children.
mar et al. 2010, Shroff 2011, Pavlopoulou et al. 2013). Steele et al. (1996)
notes that a significant amount of unexplained variation in immunization up-
take can be attributed to differences in knowledge and attitudes towards health
care as well as power relationships within households. In this paper, I con-
trol for variation in parental attitudes by adding mother-fixed effects, and I
investigate how power relationships and knowledge across generations affect
the health outcomes of children.
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1.2 Conceptual Framework
Let there be a three generation household that includes grandparents,
parents and a child. For simplicity, let us assume that decisions related to
health are taken only by female members, i.e., the grandmother and the
mother. Let there be one final good, health of the child (H), that has two
states: good health (H=1) and bad health (H=0). Let there be one binary in-
put to health, immunization, i∈{0,1}, which enters into the health probability
of the child:
E[H|i] = p(i) s.t. p(1) > p(0)
Assume that the mother knows this true probability while the grandmother
forms beliefs about the probability distribution s.t.
Eg[H|i] = pg(i)
s.t. pg(1)− pg(0) < p(1)− p(0) and pg(0) = p(0)
Let there be an intangible cost, c, of changing prior attitudes about immuniza-
tion and acquiring more information about the true probability distribution
of health outcomes.17 The grandmother has to incur this cost if she chooses
i=1, but she does not have to incur this cost if she chooses i=0. Now, agent
17Mothers are more educated than grandmothers and young women are more likely to
receive information about new born care through awareness campaigns and health workers.
This is why I assume that the mothers know true health probability. Implications of this
model will be similar if we assume that the mother and the grandmother have same dated
beliefs about health probability but the cost of updating beliefs is higher for the grandmother
than the mother.
14







p(i)1(H = 1) + (1− p(i))1(H = 0)− cj
Case I: When the mother is the decision-maker, p(1)>p(0) and c=0. Thus,
H(1)>H(0), and i*=1.
Case II: When the grandmother is the decision-maker:
H(1) = pg(1)[1(H = 1)− 1(H = 0)] + 1(H = 0)− c
H(0) = pg(0)[1(H = 1)− 1(H = 0)] + 1(H = 0)
Thus, H(1)>H(0) and i*=1 iff [pg(1)− pg(0)] > c.
Case III: When the mother and the grandmother both are involved in decision-
making.
Let µ be the bargaining power of the mother and (1 − µ) be the bargaining
power of the grandmother.
H(i) = µ[p(i)1(H = 1) + (1− p(i))1(H = 0)]+
(1− µ)[pg(i)1(H = 1) + (1− pg(i))1(H = 0)− c]
Thus, i*=1 iff
µ[p(1)− p(0)] > (1− µ)[c− (pg(1)− pg(0))]
Thus, given the differences in beliefs about the distribution over the
health outcomes, the grandmother is more likely to choose no immunization
15
than the mother. When both the grandmother and the mother are involved
in decision-making, immunization is chosen only if the mother has enough
bargaining power such that the product of her bargaining power and gain
from immunization outweighs the product of the grandmother’s bargaining
power and the sum of the cost of immunization and her perceived loss from
immunization.18
1.3 Estimation Strategy
The decision to live with a parent-in-law is endogenous. Thus, a simple
comparison of households which have grandparents with those that don’t will
not capture the causal effect of the presence of grandparents. In order to
compare three-generation households to two-generation households, I use the
shock to household structure caused by the death of the last living grandparent.
A potential concern is that the distribution of the timing of the death of a
grandparent across households may not be random. Poorer families may have
unobservable characteristics that are correlated with low life expectancy as
well as child healthcare decisions. Summary statistics presented in Columns
1-3 of Table 1.2 show that there are some systematic differences between the
households in which the last living grandparent died and the households in
which no grandparent died during the reference period. For instance, the
families that do not experience death in general are more educated and include
18In 3-generation Indian households, young mothers usually are not the decision makers,
and so the analysis is closer to Case II than Case III.
16
younger mothers. In the estimation, I include controls for all these observables,
but it is important to note that there is a concern for selection if we consider
only those families which experienced death.
To address the sample selection concern, I use the timing of birth rel-
ative to the death as an exogenous variation. Using this variation, I employ
two empirical strategies: (i) I compare children born after the death of the last
living grandparents to children born before the death and to children in house-
holds where a grandparent is present; and (ii) I add mother-fixed effects.19 In
the former strategy I compare children across households, while in the latter,
I compare children born within the same household.
To apply the first strategy, I include two indicators: one for whether
the last living grandparent in the household died during the reference period
and another for whether the child was born after the death of the last living
grandparent. For children born in households in which the last living grand-
parent died, whether a child is born before or after the death is considered to
be random. Thus, the indicator for whether a child is born after the death
captures the reduced form effect of being born in a two-generation household
without grandparents. The estimating equation for this approach is as follows:
Yimt = α0 + α1Dmt + α2Bimt + α3Ximt + εimt (1.1)
Yimt is the health outcome of a child i born to mother m at time t. Dmt
is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the last living grandparent in the
19Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2014) and Persson and Rossin-Slater (2014) have used












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































household died during the reference period and 0 otherwise. Bimt an indicator
that shows whether child i was born after the death of the grandparent; it
takes the value of 1 if the child was born after the death of the last living
grandparent, and 0 if the child was born in the presence of a grandparent (i.e.,
those born before the death or into families that do not experience a death).
Thus, the coefficient of this indicator compares outcomes of children born
in two-generation households with those born in three-generation households.
Ximt includes individual-level characteristics such as gender, an indicator for
first male child, the mother’s age at birth, dummies for child age, birth order,
birth month, and birth year. I also include household-level characteristics such
as paternal and maternal education, household size, type of residence (rural or
urban), religion, and caste of the head of the household. α1 captures the effect
of being born in a household which experienced a death. The coefficient of
interest, α2, captures the effect of being born in the absence of a grandparent,
i.e., in a two-generation household structure.
In the second empirical strategy, I add mother-fixed effects. Here I
leverage the fact that many women in the sample had more than one birth
during the reference period. For women who have had more than one birth,
it is possible that one child is born before and another after the death of
the last living grandparent. This provides a unique opportunity to compare
children born to the same mother but in different household structures (two-
versus three-generation households). Incorporating mother-fixed effects also
allows me to separate out time-invariant factors specific to the mother or the
19
household. The estimating equation is as follows:
Yimt = β0 + β1Bimt + β2Ximt + φm + εimt (1.2)
All the variables are the same as in equation (1.1) except that this specification
includes mother-fixed effect (φm). Adding mother-fixed effects alleviates the
concern that the mother’s (or the household’s) unobservables are biasing the
results.20
The key identifying assumption of this analysis is that the timing of
the birth, conditional on death, is exogenous.21 Columns 4-6 of Table 1.2
show that conditional on death, the observable characteristics of the sample
of children born after the death are similar to those born before the death.
In addition, I check whether the observable characteristics are associated with
timing of birth relative to the death. Table A.1 shows the results of a re-
gression of observable characteristics on an indicator for being born after the
death for the sample of household that experienced the death of the last liv-
ing grandparent. None of the observables (except the age of the mother at
birth and the grandparent’s age) significantly predict the timing of the birth
20If the birth of a child affects the probability of the death of a grandparent because of
factors such as less time for elderly care, then there is a concern for reverse causality. To test
that this is not the case, I estimate heterogeneity in results by the number of adult members.
Since time constraint for elderly care is less likely to be binding in households with more
adults, the issue of reverse causality would not be as prominent for larger households. I do
not find any evidence for heterogeneity in results by the number of adult members.
21This would be problematic if the grandparents’ presence directly affected the fertility
decisions in the household. To alleviate this concern, Figure A.1 shows that the frequency
of birth is smooth around the death of a grandparent.
20
relative to the timing of the grandparent’s death.22 While these covariates
(except advice about immunization) are time invariant for a given household,
the results show that conditional on death, the observables of a household are
not correlated with the timing of birth.
Another important assumption is that the outcomes of children born
before the death of the grandparent are not affected by the death. This as-
sumption will be problematic if the grandparent dies after a long illness. In
such a case, the children born before the death may have been affected by
changes in time constraints (e.g., increased care for ill grandparent) or bargain-
ing power. Thus, if the control group is also affected by the imminent death of
the grandparent, the estimates would be biased. Ideally, using deaths caused
by accidents would alleviate this concern. However, the dataset used does
not provide any information about the cause of death. Using another nation-
ally representative survey data (Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS),
2004-05), which includes the cause of deaths, I find that 80 percent of deaths
of grandparents were due to unexpected accidents and short-term illness like
heart attack, diarrhea, or fever (see Table A.3).23 Hence, I expect the bias
that can be attributed to the effect of death on control group to be small.
It is important to note that these strategies capture the reduced form
22By construction, the age of the mother is likely to be correlated with being born after a
death in a household that has two or more children. Nevertheless, I add all of these variables
to the regression equations.
23This only includes the deaths for which the causes were known. Missing values were
excluded.
21
effect of the death of the last living grandparent. To separate the direct ef-
fects of the death from the effect of household structure change, I employ the
same empirical strategies to compare households in which the second-to-last
grandparent dies to households in which the last living grandparent dies.
1.4 Data
This paper uses the District-Level Household Survey (DLHS) of India
for the years 2002-04 and 2007-08. This is a nationally representative dataset
that includes immunization and birth history for children born to married
women between the ages of 15 and 44 during a 3-year reference period. To
supplement the analysis I also use the Indian Human Development Survey
(IHDS) data for the years 2005 and 2012. IHDS is also a nationally represen-
tative dataset with detailed household level information.
The DLHS dataset includes information on deaths that occurred within
a household since 2001 for 2002-04 round and since 2004 for 2007-08 round,
amounting to roughly a 3-year long reference period. I use this information
to create an indicator of whether a grandparent died in the family. Since the
data does not contain information on the relationship of the deceased to the
household head, I impute whether the deceased was a grandparent based on
the age and gender of the deceased and the age and relationship among the
living household members. Appendix A1 shows the details of the imputation.
To confirm the accuracy of the imputed relationship of the deceased, I use the
IHDS sample in which the relationship of the deceased is known, and I find
22
that the correlation between the imputed relationship and true relationship is
0.998.
1.4.1 Outcome Variables
The data includes the immunization history of the last two live births
that occurred during the three-year reference period. Information about whether
the children received Oral Polio Vaccine (OPV), Bacillus CalmetteGuri (BCG),
and Hepatitis B vaccination is used to create the key outcome variable, which
is vaccination at birth.24 Vaccination at birth is an indicator that takes the
value one if the child received all three of these vaccines and zero otherwise.25
Another outcome of interest is whether colostrum is given to the new-
born. The mother’s first milk, colostrum, is rich in antibodies that protect
the newborn from diseases. In developing countries, there is a widespread lack
of awareness about its qualities and its key role in contributing to the health
and growth of the newborn.26 In many cultures (including those in India),
colostrum is believed to be unclean due to its thick yellowish appearance, and
it is often discarded. The DLHS dataset provides information about whether
colostrum was given to the youngest child born during the reference period.
24Bacillus CalmetteGurin vaccine is a vaccine primarily used against tuberculosis. Polio,
BCG and Hepatitis B vaccines constitute the recommended vaccinations that are to be
administered to the infant at the time of birth.




Given that the immunization data is available for children born during
the three year reference period, the sample is restricted to children aged 0-3
years. I exclude children born during the same month and year as the death
because I do not know the exact death and birth dates and cannot determine
whether these children were born before or after the death. Also, to reduce
the immunization delays caused by grieving or care-giving for the terminally
ill, I do not include children who were born a month before or a month after
a grandparent death.27
To causally identify the effects of changes in household structure, I only
include households in which the last living grandparent died during the refer-
ence period (treated group) and households in which exactly one grandparent
is alive and no grandparent died during the reference period (control group).28
I exclude families in which both grandparents are alive, although the results
are not affected if I add these families back into the sample (see results in
Section 1.7). I also exclude families in which the second-to-last-living grand-
parent died during my primary analysis, and I do so because these deaths do
not produce a change in household structure. In a supplementary analysis,
27Results are similar if I include these children in the sample. The results do not change
if I assign to the children born in the same month as the death either value 1 or 0 for the
born after death variable.
28My decision to define the control group as families in which exactly one grandparent is
alive is motivated by the thought that prior to death, the treated households, too, had ex-
actly one grandparent. Thus, households that have one living grandparent are a comparable
control group.
24
I include these excluded households to estimate the direct effects of death,
in the absence of a change in household structure. Lastly, I exclude nuclear
households in which there was no death during the reference period and no
living grandparent in the household because I do not know why a grandparent
is absent: the grandparent could have died long before the reference period
or s/he could be living somewhere else.29 Table A.2 compares the households
in the analysis sample to an unrestricted sample that includes all household
structures. Columns 1 and 2 of Table A.2 show that in most observables the
sample of all households resembles the households that are included in my
analysis.
In order to include mother-fixed effects, the sample used for immuniza-
tion outcome analysis is restricted to mothers who had at least two births
during the reference period. Column 3 of Table A.2 shows that women who
had two or more children during the reference period are similar to the sample
of all women who had children during the reference period (Column 2). While
the differences in observables in Columns 2 and 3 are statistically significant
for some observables, the magnitude of difference is not very large. I include
these observables as covariates in the analysis to control for any observable
differences.
29I also exclude households in which both grandparents died during the reference pe-
riod. Very few households in the sample experienced two deaths and two births during the




Figure 1.2 plots the binned residuals for the regression of probability of
vaccination from Section 3, with the indicator for born after death excluded,
against the time that passed between the birth of a grandchild and the death
of a grandparent.30 Panel A and Panel B of Figure 1.2 plot the residuals
from regression in the equation 1.1 (no mother-fixed effects) and the equation
1.2 (with mother-fixed effects), respectively. As the figure shows, the residu-
als for the probability of vaccination jump after the death of the last living
grandparent.
1.5.1 Results from Change in a Household Structure
Columns 1-3 of Table 1.3 present the results for the first estimating
strategy. All specifications include demographic controls.31 Standard errors
are clustered by PSU level. Column 1 shows that being born after the death
of the last living grandparent increases the probability of immunization at
birth by 4.7 percentage points. By construction, the children born after the
death also have a higher birth order. Thus, to ensure that the results are
30For children born before the death of a grandparent or in households that had no death,
the time passed between birth of a grandchild and death of a grandparent (x-axis) can be
interpreted as time spent in the presence of a grandparent.
31Demographic controls include dummies for the child’s age and gender, controls for the
mother’s age at birth, the age of the grandparent at the time of the child’s birth, paternal
and maternal education, an indicator of whether the child is a first male child, household
size, type of residence (rural or urban), religion, caste of the head of the household, number
of adult males, number of adult females, primary sampling unit (PSU) fixed effects and
interaction of survey year- and survey month-fixed effects. The primary sampling unit



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































not confounded by birth order effects, in the subsequent regressions I add
birth order dummies. The results in Column 2 are similar to those shown in
Column 1. It is possible that children born during a particular month or year
are especially likely to be immunized (perhaps because of a local immunization
drive or health camp). In Column 3, I add birth year- and birth month-fixed
effects to control for these effects. Columns 1-3 of Table 1.3 show that the
results are similar across specifications.
Columns 4-6 of Table 1.3 present the results of the second estimating
strategy, which uses mother-fixed effects. In these specifications, I do not
include controls for time-invariant household specific characteristics such as the
death of a grandparent, maternal and paternal education, religion, and caste.
The estimates suggest that children born after the death of a grandparent are
4.9 percentage points more likely to be immunized at birth. This is a large
effect considering that the average immunization rate is 13.3 percent.32 Going
forward, for immunization results I will present only the specification that
includes all the fixed effects (birth order, birth year and birth month).
Table 1.4 presents the results for the probability of giving colostrum to
newborns. The sample used for this analysis includes all mothers who gave
birth during the reference period. Since the data includes information about
colostrum only for the youngest child born during the reference period, I cannot
32Note that the outcome variable is an index of all recommended vaccines to be admin-
istered at birth. Although the immunization rate for a particular vaccine might be higher,














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































use the second approach for the colostrum outcome (because it is not possible
to add mother-fixed effects). However, I can add household-fixed effects for
the subsample of households that have two or more daughters-in-law who gave
birth during the reference period. Like Table 1.3, Columns 1-3 subsequently
add dummies for birth order, birth year and birth month. The estimates from
Table 1.4 show that children born after the death of a grandparent are 3.6
percentage points more likely to be given colostrum. Given the baseline mean
of 0.62, the estimates suggest that a child is 5.6 percent more likely to be
fed colostrum if s/he is born after the death of the last living grandparent.
Columns 4-6 show a 5.8-6.2 percentage point increase in the probability of
giving colostrum to the newborn, but these estimates are not significant (due
to the lack of power). As shown in Table 1.4, the results do not change
significantly when other fixed effects are added. This suggests that the results
are not driven by birth order or time effects.
1.5.2 Direct Effects of Death
As mentioned previously, the death of a grandparent can have direct
effects on household decisions through a change in household resources (income
and time), and stress caused by the death. The estimates presented in Section
1.5.1 show the reduced form effects of death which include direct effects of
death as well as the effects of change in household structure. In this section,
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For colostrum outcome, it is unlikely that a mechanism other than
changes in information and bargaining power is driving the results. This is
because colostrum outcome is unlikely to be affected by changes in household
resources and the practice of throwing away colostrum is driven by cultural
myths. In other words, if the mechanism behind the results was a change in
income, we would not expect any significant impact on the colostrum outcome.
In the case of the immunization outcome, it is comparatively more
likely that the reduced form effects of Table 1.3 include the effect of changes
in household resources, in addition to the effects of a change in household
structure.33 However, Table 1.1 shows that the majority of women stated
that family and knowledge constraints are the primary reason that they do
not immunize children. Thus, as suggested by Table 1.1, the contribution of
changes in resources, such as income and time, on the estimates is likely to be
small.
To empirically test if my results are driven by the direct effects of death,
I compare the families in which the last living grandparent has died to families
in which only one of the two living grandparents has died. In this strategy,
both the control group and the treated group have experienced a death. This
strategy separates the additional effect of a change in household structure
(resulting from the death of the last living grandparent) from the direct effect
33Though the vaccinations studied in this paper are either free or subsidized, other costs
could exist, such as transportation to the health center, bribes, and time costs associated
with immunization.
32
of the death of a grandparent. But this specification raises the aforementioned
sample selection concern because all households in the sample have experienced
a death. The results from Table 1.5 show that the death of a grandparent has
a negative direct effect on the probability of immunization. But this negative
effect is outweighed by the positive effect of the change in household structure.
Thus, the results from Table 1.5 confirm that children born after the death
of the last living grandparent are more likely to get immunized than children
born before the death, and these effects are not driven by the direct effects of
death such as changes in resources.34
Another way to capture the direct effects of death is to compare fam-
ilies that experience the death of one of the two grandparents to families in
which both grandparents are alive and that experienced no deaths during the
reference period. If my primary estimates were driven by the direct effects
of the death of a grandparent, then I would find similar effects following the
death of the second-to-last living grandparent. According to Table A.5, the
effect of being born after the death of the second-to-last grandparent is nega-
tive and significant. Also note that, although the samples used in Tables 1.3,
1.5 and A.5 are different (but overlapping), the magnitudes of reduced form
and direct effect estimates are comparable across these specifications.
34Note that in households in which there are two living grandparents, grandfather is
usually the first one to die (about 72 percent of my sample). To make sure that the difference
in effects of death are not driven by the gender of the grandparent, I repeat this analysis with
(i) subsample in which only grandmothers die, and (ii) subsample in which only grandfather
die. The magnitude and significance of the results change, but the direction remains the
same for each of these subsamples.
33
Table 1.5: Dependent Variable - Vaccination at Birth
(1) (2)
Born after Death*Last Living GP Died 0.108*** 0.102***
(0.030) (0.030)
Born after Death -0.047* -0.032
(0.027) (0.028)
Last Living GP Died -0.229*
(0.121)
Demographic Controls X X
Birth order dummies X X
Birth year and birth month dummies X X
Mother FE X
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.15 0.15
Observations 2,986 2,986
Notes: The sample includes mothers who have had two or more births during
the reference period in households in which one grandparent died. The treated
group includes households in which the last living grandparent died; in the
control households one grandparent is alive. The variable Last Living GP
Died is an indicator for the treated group in which the last living grandparent
died. The unit of observation is the child. Demographic controls include:
the child’s gender; child age dummies; whether the child is a first male child;
whether the child is the first born; the mother’s age at birth; paternal and
maternal education; whether the father lives in the household; the rank of
the mother; the death of an older child; the number of daughters-in-law in
the household; the presence of old individuals other than grandparents; the
imputed age of the grandparents; household size; the number of children born
during the reference period; the type of residence (rural or urban); religion;
caste of the head of the household; the number of adult males; the number of
adult females; primary sampling unit (PSU) fixed effects; and the interaction
of survey year and survey month dummies. PSU is defined as a village for
rural areas and a census block for urban areas. Column (1) shows results from
the estimation equation 1, which includes an indicator for the death of the
last living grandparent and another indicator for the child being born after
the death of the grandparent. Column (2) presents results from empirical
equation 2, which includes mother-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at PSU level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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The evidence presented in this section suggests that while the direct
effects of death are negative, the effects of a change in a household structure
outweigh the negative effects of death on neonatal care outcomes. Hence, the
evidence presented in this section indicates that presence of older generations
within a household is an important determinant of adoption of neonatal care
best-practices.
1.6 Heterogeneity in Results
In this section, I explore the heterogeneity in results by household com-
position, rank of the mother, gender of the grandparent, and the sex of the
grandchild.
1.6.1 Number and Rank of Daughters-in-law
In households that have only one married couple in the second gener-
ation, the death of the last living grandparent results in a complete transfer
of bargaining power to the young couple. However, in households that have
more than one married couple, the redistribution of bargaining power among
daughters-in-law (DIL) after the death of grandparents is unclear a priori.
CKS (2013) states that in households that have more than one daughter-in-
law the husband’s higher birth parity entitles DILs to higher intra-household
ranks.
Table 1.6 presents results for heterogeneity across different household
35
structures and ranks of DILs.35 Columns 1 and 2 show the results for immu-
nization at birth; Columns 3 and 4 show the results for colostrum outcome.
Panel A of Table 1.6 shows that the estimates for households that have one
DIL and households that have two or more DILs are not statistically different.
Similarly, Panel B of Table 1.6 shows that, conditional on being in a house-
hold that has more than one DIL, the results are not significantly different
across ranks of the mother.36, 37 Thus, I do not find any evidence supporting
discriminatory behavior of in-laws based on the intra-household rank of the
mother.
1.6.2 Gender of the Grandparent and the Grandchild
Table 1.7 shows the heterogeneity in results by the gender of grandpar-
ent and grandchild. In Panel A of Table 1.7, the estimates for immunization
outcome are larger when a grandmother dies than when a grandfather dies,
but the differences are not statistically significant. For the colostrum outcome,
the effects of grandmother’s and grandfather’s death (Column 3) are not sta-
tistically different, but the effects of the grandmother’s death are larger when
household-fixed effects are added. These results should be interpreted with
35The rank of a mother is defined as her rank among the DILs in the household in order
of age.
36The results of Table 1.6 are robust to inclusion of all household structures - i.e., including
households that have only one DIL.
37The framework of Section 2 suggests that as long as the DILS share the same beliefs
about the distribution of health outcomes, the effect of the death of a grandparent should not
vary across households that have different number of DILS or ranks of DILS. The estimates
support the information-gap and differential belief hypothesis presented in Section 2.
36
Table 1.6: Heterogeneity by Household Composition
Vaccination at Birth Colostrum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Number of Daughters-in-Law
Born after Death*1 DIL 0.042* 0.045** 0.034*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020)
Born after Death* ≥ 2 DILs 0.081* 0.101** 0.044
(0.043) (0.045) (0.043)
2 or more DILs 0.028 0.010
(0.035) (0.015)
Mother FE X




Observations 12,064 12,064 48,157
Panel B: Rank of the mother
Born after Death*Rank1 0.112** 0.136** 0.045 0.081
(0.053) (0.058) (0.090) (0.136)
Born after Death*Rank ≥ 2 0.130** 0.126** 0.054 0.042
(0.060) (0.061) (0.090) (0.155)




Mean of Dep Variable 0.17 0.17 0.64 0.61
p-value (Equality of
Interaction terms)
0.83 0.91 0.89 0.56
Observations 2,314 2,314 9,752 3,308
Notes: Columns 1-2 include mothers who have had two or more births during
the reference period, Column 3 includes all mothers that had a birth during
the reference period, and Column 4 includes households in which two or more
daughter-in-laws had a birth during the reference period. Standard errors are
clustered at the PSU level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
37
caution because about 70 percent of households had grandmother as the last
living grandparent.38 Panel B of Table 1.7 shows that the effect of the death
of a grandparent is similar for both male and female children.39
1.7 Robustness Checks
Placebo Deaths: As a falsification test to confirm that my results
are not spurious, I compare (i) households in which a member from the same
generation (not a grandparent) dies to (ii) households with no death during
the reference period. To compare these to my main estimates, I restrict the
sample to households that have one living grandparent. If my results were
driven by direct effects of death and change in household structure had no
effect on household decisions, then I should expect similar results from death
of any family member. The estimates from this analysis (not presented in this
paper) show that the death of a household member, who is not a grandparent,
has a negative and insignificant effect.
Choice of Control Group: To show that my results are not sensitive
38This is because the sample includes households with only one living grandparent and
women typically live longer than men.
39Table A.6 shows that girls born after the death of a grandmother have significantly
higher probability of being vaccinated than girls who are born after the death of a grand-
father or boys born after the death of grandmother. The p-value for differences in the
coefficient for girls born after the death of the grandmother and the grandfather is 0.0254;
for boys born after the death of a grandmother it is 0.0293. This suggests that boys are
more likely to be vaccinated while grandmothers are alive. This finding also implies that
in the case of grandsons, grandmothers might favor medical interventions over traditional
wisdom. I caution that more detailed data and analysis on the information and beliefs is
required to draw any conclusions about grandson preference.
38
Table 1.7: Heterogeneity by Gender
Vaccination at Birth Colostrum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Gender of the Grandparent
Born after Death*GM 0.052 0.059* 0.016 0.232
(0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.209)
Born after Death*GF 0.039 0.040* 0.051** -0.174





Mean of Dependent Variable 0.13 0.13 0.62 0.61
p-value (Equality of
Interaction terms)
0.74 0.64 0.36 0.12
Observations 12,060 12,060 48,157 3,308
Panel B: Gender of the Grandchild
Born after Death*Girl 0.042 0.062** 0.031 0.083
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.139)
Born after Death*Boy 0.050* 0.041 0.038 -0.055
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.191)
Girl -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.017





0.83 0.58 0.88 0.37
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.13 0.13 0.62 0.61
Observations 12,060 12,060 48,157 3,308
Notes: GM denotes households in which the grandmother either died or is the
only living grandparent Columns 1-2 include mothers who had two or more
births during the reference period; Column 3 includes all mothers who had
a birth during the reference period; and Column 4 includes households that
have two or more daughters-in-law who gave birth during the reference period.
Standard errors are clustered at the PSU level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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to the choice of the control group, I include households in which one or more
grandparents are alive. The estimates from Table A.7 confirm that my results
are robust to the choice of the control group.
Robustness to Definition of Outcome Index: In India, different
vaccines might have different levels of supply outreach. For example, be-
cause of the focus in India on the eradication of polio, during the late 1990s,
Oral Polio Vaccine’s outreach increased significantly more than other vaccines.
Moreover, information about different vaccines is likely to differ across genera-
tions. For instance, because BCG and OPV have been a part of the mandatory
immunization schedule for a longer period than Hepatitis B, information and
perceptions about these vaccines could differ. To determine whether my results
are sensitive to the choice of the index of immunization, Table A.8 shows the
results for alternative definitions of the index. Panel A of Table A.8 shows the
results for alternative definitions of the immunization index that use a combi-
nation of two out of the three vaccines to be administered at birth. Panel B
presents the results for individual vaccines. The results of Table A.8 suggest
that my estimates are robust to the definitions of the immunization index.40
Choice of Sample: Table A.9 presents the estimates using a different
dataset. The IHDS dataset does not provide comparably detailed information
about timing of death but it does provide more accurate information about
40The results for BCG vaccine are not significant but the sign is positive. This is probably
because of widespread outreach for BCG vaccines. Given that mass campaigns for BCG were
launched more than half a century ago (during the 1950s), it is likely that the information-
gap about the importance of BCG vaccines differs little across generations (Lahariya, 2014).
40
the relationship of the deceased to the head of the household. IHDS also maps
a longer time horizon, from 2001 to 2012. Due to data constraints in the IHDS
sample, the outcome variable for this analysis is an index of two vaccines (OPV
and BCG). Column 1 of Table A.9 presents the estimates for this new outcome
variable using the original specification. Columns 2 and 3 show the estimates
with a subset of controls using the DLHS and IHDS samples, respectively.
Panel A of Table A.9 shows that when IHDS sample is used the estimates
are larger and less precise. This lack of precision can be attributed to the
small sample size of children born after the death in households that have
experienced death. A possible explanation for the larger IHDS estimates is
that it includes a longer time period. Panel B shows that the increase in the
probability of vaccination associated with an additional year since death for
children born after death is similar across the two dataset.
1.8 Discussion
The discussion in Section 1.5.2 showed that the direct effects of the
death of a grandparent are negative, but these effects are outweighed by the
positive effects of a change in household structure. In this section, I elaborate
on the discussion of mechanisms through which the death of a grandparent
can affect neonatal outcomes.
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1.8.1 Time Constraints
Child health outcomes can be affected by the role played by grandpar-
ents in the household (whether or not the household structure changes); for
example, are the grandparents care-receivers or care-givers? If the grandpar-
ents were care-receivers, their deaths should loosen the time constraint and
increase the probability of immunization. To test this possibility, I estimate
the heterogeneity in results by the number of adult males or females in the
household (unmarried siblings of the parent or older siblings of the infants).
If time constraint is the main mechanism that drives the effect of the presence
of grandparents, then the presence of other adults in the household should re-
duce the burden of caring for the dying grandparent, and the estimates should
become smaller as the number of adults in the household increases. The es-
timation results (not presented here for the sake of brevity) suggest that the
effects do not differ by the number of adult males, or number of adult females
in the household.
If the grandparents were care-providers, their deaths should result in
a decreased probability of vaccination for children born after a death. The
negative estimates from Table 1.5 and A.5 suggest that a set of grandparents
might act as care providers. However, in the cases where only one grandparent
is present, the time constraint imposed by the grandparent is unclear. Note
that in households that have only one living grandparent, the grandparent
is older than the grandparents found households in which both grandparents
are alive. This could result in smaller negative effects from time constraint in
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households that have only one living grandparent because older grandparents
are perhaps less able than younger ones to provide childcare.
1.8.2 Stress caused by Death
Another concern in this analysis is the confounding in-utero stress effect
caused by the death of a family member. According to some studies, the death
of a family member significantly increases in-utero stress and this stress affects
the later health outcomes of children (Black et al 2014, Currie and Rossin-
Slator 2013). Here I focus on neonatal care outcomes such as immunization
and breastfeeding practices rather than biological health outcomes. Because
these decisions are made once the child is born, my results are unlikely to
be biased by the stress-effect on in-utero children caused by the death of a
family member. Nevertheless, stress caused by death could result in a delay in
vaccinations. Assuming that the stress or the grief effect of death is likely to
lessen with time, I run my estimation with subsamples that exclude children
born between 3, 6 and 9 months before and after the death, to allow for more
grieving time. The results (not shown here) are similar to the estimates of
Table 1.3. Thus, the results are unlikely to be driven by grief-effects.
1.8.3 Place of Delivery
An increase in immunization also could be driven by an increase in
the number of births at a health facility. In other words, if the choice of the
place of delivery is affected by the death of a grandparent, then my estimates
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might be capturing the effect of being born in a hospital. There are two
ways in which the death of a grandparent can affect the choice of the place of
delivery: (i) a change in financial resources and (ii) a change in the bargaining
power of the mother. If the death leads to tighter budget constraint (fewer
resources) there will be a decrease in deliveries at health facilities. Because
immunization is positively correlated with delivery at a health facility, we
should see an accompanying decrease in immunization. My findings suggest
that the opposite is true. In fact, the probability of immunization is higher for
children who are born after the death of the last living grandparent. On the
other hand, if the death leads to an increase in available financial resources,
then we should expect to see an increase in both the number of deliveries at
health facilities and immunizations. Unfortunately, I do not know the place
of delivery for all children in my sample, and I cannot empirically test if
this is true. However, in families in which the last living grandparent has
died, 13 percent of women state that financial constraints are the primary
reason for not delivering the child at a health facility; in families that have not
experienced a death, only 10 percent of women say this.41 This suggests that
a change in financial resources is not the primary reason to drive any changes
in institutional deliveries.
As mentioned above, the death of a grandparent can loosen informa-
tion and family constraints, and this can lead to more deliveries taking place
41Author’s calculations. The statistics are derived from a subsample of DLHS data,
including married women aged 15-44, who delivered the child at home.
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at health facilities. When this is the case, the immunization estimates will
be influenced by the effects of the absence of grandparents on the delivery
outcomes. Given that the correlation between being vaccinated at birth and
being born at a health facility is 0.25, not all of the increase in immunization
can be attributed to the increase in institutional delivery.42 Moreover, an in-
creases in institutional deliveries, even if they lead to increased immunizations,
are likely to be driven by changes in information and bargaining constraints.
This suggests that the presence of grandparents has implications that extend
beyond neonatal care outcomes to maternal health, which is beyond the scope
of this paper.43
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I estimate the causal effect of the absence of grandparents
on neonatal care outcomes in India. Using exogenous variation in the timing of
42This correlation is calculated using the subsample of youngest children born during the
reference period for whom the information on place of delivery is available.
43Appendix Table A.10 shows the results for choice of the place of delivery as outcome.
The information on the place of delivery is available only for the youngest child, and hence
I cannot add mother fixed effects. In Panel A, I show the results for sample including
all households in treated group and control group. In Panel B, I restrict the sample to
only include households which have two or more DILs, and more than one DIL gave birth
during the reference period. Columns 1-3 show results for empirical strategy one (without
any household fixed effects). In Columns 4-6, I include household fixed effects. As shown
in Appendix Table A.10, the direction of the results vary depending on the sample used.
An explanation for this fluctuation in results is that, unlike the colostrum outcome, an
important factor for the choice of the place of delivery is household income. Moreover,
number of women present in the household to provide care during delivery could also affect
the choice of place of delivery. The dynamics involved in the decision for the choice of place
of delivery are more complicated and beyond the scope of this paper.
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birth relative to the timing of death of a grandparent, I find that children born
after the death are 4.4-4.9 percentage points more likely to be immunized at
birth and 3.4 percentage points more likely to be given colostrum. I do not find
any heterogeneity in results across the sex of the child or the grandparents. The
results of this paper suggest that one way to improve neonatal care practices
is to include older generations in healthcare informational interventions.
In addition to identifying the causal impact of grandparents on neona-
tal care, this paper has broad implications for future work. The results in-
dicate that grandparents play an important role in critical household deci-
sions, including those that affect child survival. My findings provide evidence
that multigenerational households are slower to adopt new health technolo-
gies, likely because grandparents have different preferences for and knowledge
about these technologies than parents. Thus, household structure is an impor-
tant factor in assessing the demand for investments in children and technology
diffusion. In future research, it would be useful to extend this analysis by
studying the effect of grandparents on other important household decisions




Impact of Free School Lunch Program in India
Food for Education programs have been used as a policy instrument
to incentivize school participation for many years across the globe. School
Feeding Programs (SFPs) are associated with various benefits including im-
proved health, higher future productivity, better cognitive ability, gender eq-
uity and reduced child labor (Gundersen et al. 2012, Mirtcheva and Powell
2013). Given the wide range of benefits, SFPs have been adopted in various
developing as well as developed nations. Based on a sample of 169 countries,
a study by the World Food Programme (Burbano de Lara et al. 2013) es-
timates a potential annual investment of approximately $47 - $75 billion in
school feeding programs around the globe, reaching out to over 368 million
children. As noted by the WFP, India’s school feeding program, known as
the Mid Day Meal Scheme (MDMS), is the largest school feeding program in
the world covering 113.6 million beneficiaries. This paper studies the impact
of this nationally mandated free school lunch program on the probability of
enrollment in primary schools in India.
The Mid Day Meal Scheme is a right-based program which entitles all
children between the ages of 6-10 to free meals in public schools, and is aimed at
47
incentivizing primary school attendance and achieving better nutritional out-
comes for young children. Mid Day Meal Scheme is not only the largest school
feeding program in the world, but is also among the top ten flagship programs
of the Government of India. In 2016-17, MDMS was allocated $1.5billion in
the annual federal budget.1 Despite the large overall budgetary allocation,
when compared to school feeding programs in other countries, MDMS has one
of the lowest per child annual cost (see Table B.1). In light of increasing policy
focus of child nutrition and universal primary education, the combination of
low per child cost and large scale coverage makes MDMS a unique program to
study the impact of school feeding programs.
While SFPs are generally considered to be effective in raising school
attendance, the magnitude of effect varies depending on contexts (Alderman
et al. 2012). An explanation for the variation in magnitude is that most of the
literature includes small-scale studies which are difficult to generalize. Another
caveat of this literature is that most existing studies estimate an intent-to-treat
effect, which does not account for gaps in program implementation or uptake
(Kremer and Vermeersch 2005, Kazinga et al. 2009, Jayaraman and Simroth
2011). This paper addresses these concerns in the literature by using a large
dataset, and estimating a local average treatment effect to examine the impact
of the world’s largest SFP on school enrollment.
I use data from Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS), 2005,
1Government of India, http://mdm.nic.in/
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and National Family Health Survey (NFHS), 1998-99, to study the impact
of MDMS on school enrollment for children in primary school. I exploit
the variation in the adoption of the policy across states and time, and use
a difference-in-differences technique to evaluate the intent-to-treat (ITT) im-
pact of the program on educational outcomes.2 The ITT impact captures the
average difference in the mean of outcomes of states which received the policy
after 2001 (treatment group) and those which had the policy since the 1980s
(control groups). However, there are two concerns with the ITT estimates in
the context of the MDMS: (1) the level of implementation of the policy differed
across and within states due to various factors such as bad governance, low
political will, and insufficient budgetary allocations, and (2) the control states
also benefited from this national policy. To address the concern of endogenous
level of implementation, I evaluate the local average treatment effect (LATE)
of the program on enrollment, using the policy as an instrument for fraction of
schools actually offering free meals. While the ITT estimate gives the impact
of the opportunity of being able to receive free meals in school, the LATE
estimate captures the impact of actually receiving free school meals.
The findings of my analysis suggest that the program significantly in-
creased the probability of primary school enrollment. The ITT effect estimates
a 6 percentage point increase in gross as well as net primary school enrollment
due to the policy.3 This effect translates into 5.5% (7.3%) increase in the
2Prior to 2001, only a few states had a (state-funded) MDMS. These states constitute
the control group for my analysis.
3Net primary enrollment is the ratio of number of students aged 6-10 years enrolled in
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gross (net) primary school enrollment. The LATE estimate suggests 1 percent
increase in the fraction of treated population increases the gross and net enroll-
ment probability by 0.25 and 0.26 percentage points, respectively. To examine
the extensive margin response of the policy, I study the effect of MDMS pol-
icy on enrollment in grade 1. My findings for the subsample for first graders
suggest that while the gross enrollment effects are similar for first grader, the
net enrollment effects are almost twice as large.4 This suggests that the policy
significantly increased the enrollment of young out-of-school children in grade
1. A grade-by-age analysis of enrollment reveals positive and significant effect
of the program on on-time enrollment of children in primary school.
The analysis of heterogeneity in enrollment response reveals that the
increase in probability of primary school enrollment is significantly higher for
girls compared to boys. I also find that disadvantaged population groups of
India (which include the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/STs)
and Other Backward Classes (OBCs)) show higher increases in primary school
enrollment probabilities relative to the high caste population.5 The hetero-
geneity results for enrollment in grade 1 are similar to primary school enroll-
ment results. These heterogeneous effects are in line with the findings of the
school to the number of 6-10 year-olds in the sample.
4Net enrollment ratio in grade 1 is defined as the number of students aged 6 years enrolled
in school to the number of 6 year-olds in the sample.
5The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (STs) are two groups of historically disad-
vantaged people recognized in the Constitution of India. The criterion followed for speci-
fication of a community, as scheduled tribes are indications of primitive traits, distinctive
culture, geographical isolation, shyness of contact with the community at large, and back-
wardness.
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literature, and align with the expectations that girls and children from disad-
vantaged backgrounds are likely to be more responsive to free-lunch incentives
provided by MDMS.
This paper contributes to the growing pool of literature analyzing the
impact of school feeding programs on education outcomes. Various studies
using randomized control trials have found the SFPs increased school partici-
pation, at least for girls (Kazianga et al. 2009, Kremer and Vermeersch 2004).
While the results of this paper may not be as precise as those of randomized
controlled trial studies, the results of this paper have the advantage of being
generalizable. Moreover, in contrast to the existing studies, this paper esti-
mates the local average treatment effect (LATE), explicitly incorporating the
differential level of implementation of the policy across states, which is a fea-
ture of most government-run welfare programs in developing countries. This
paper also extends the analysis to include effects of the program on on-time
enrollment and extensive margin.
This paper also contributes to the literature studying the impact of the
Mid Day Meal Scheme. This strand of literature is large but inconclusive, and
is largely restricted to small survey studies which may not be generalizable to
the national level (see Khera 2006). Moreover, the different nature of treat-
ment, region of study (survey sample from different states) and the different
estimation strategies used in these studies make the estimates incomparable.6
6For instance, Afridi et al. (2010) analyzed the treatment of offering freshly cooked
meals compared to packaged snacks in urban area schools in one Indian state and found
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The closest comparison of this paper in the MDMS literature is Jayaraman
and Simroth (2011) which also uses a large dataset to study the impact of
MDMS on enrollment.7 However, by the virtue of my data and estimation
strategy, my study has certain strengths over their analysis. First, their data
does not have any information on mid day meal implementation at the school
level, and hence relies on the ITT impact. Since these ITT estimates do not
account for the actual treatment effect on the treated, they underestimate the
program impact. In this paper, the use of instrumental variable estimation
helps me address this issue. Second, Jayaraman and Simroth (2011) use of-
ficial school level data and, thus, focus on children who are already enrolled
in schools. In contrast, this paper uses an individual-level data which allows
the analysis to include the out-of-school children to measure extensive mar-
gin response. Moreover, the enrollment statistics in their official school data
might be subject to a greater degree of measurement error (Dreze and Kingdon
2001) than data obtained from individual-level surveys.8 Lastly, my dataset
allows for a wider coverage (19 states and 1 Union Territory (UT)) compared
a significant impact on the attendance for boys but no effect on student enrollment; while
Afridi (2010) assessed the treatment of offering cooked meals compared to monthly dry
rations in rural area schools in another Indian state and found a significant impact of the
free lunch program on the daily school participation rate for girls, but insignificant results
for boys.
7Chakraborty and Jayaraman (2016) is another study that uses a national individual-
level dataset, but the focus of their paper is to study the effect of the policy on cognitive
outcomes.
8It is plausible that schools overstate official enrollment figures to maintain performance
evaluation criterion. Kingdon (2005) notes that enrollments figures in school-returns data
are unreliable because failing/unpopular publicly funded schools exaggerate their student
numbers in order to justify their existence.
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to Jayaraman and Simroth (2011), which is restricted to 15 states.9
This paper has two important implications. One, the results of this
paper highlight the importance of incorporating implementation imperfections
when evaluating policies in developing countries. The results of this paper
show that the intent-to-treat effects underestimated the true effect on the
program, captured by the LATE estimates. Two, the findings of this paper
suggest that the school feeding program had a greater response on the extensive
margin than the intensive margin in India. This distinction on margins of
response is difficult to capture when using administrative school data as it does
not allow the researcher to observe children who are not currently enrolled.
Using individual-level data, the analysis in this paper is able to capture the
policy effect of different margins and across different demographic groups.
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2.1 describes the background
of the policy and its implementation. Section 2.2 discusses the data and Section
2.3 describes the empirical strategy. Section 2.4 presents the empirical results
and robustness checks. Section 2.5 presents a discussion of the results. Lastly,
Section 2.6 concludes.
9A Union territory is a type of administrative division in the Republic of India. Unlike
states, which have their own elected governments, union territories are ruled directly by the
Union Government (Central Government).
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2.1 Institutional Background
In August 1995, the Government of India launched the National Pro-
gramme for Nutrition Support to Primary Education (also known as the Mid
Day Meal Scheme), which mandated the provision of free cooked meals in all
public primary schools across the country. Prior to 1995, only two states had
the school free (cooked) lunch program - Tamil Nadu and Gujarat.10 Under
the national MDMS, the federal government was to bear the cost of provid-
ing raw grains and the state governments were responsible for financing the
expenditure of cooking the grains and providing cooked meals in schools. In
the interim, the states that could not make immediate budgetary or imple-
mentation arrangements were allowed to distribute monthly dry ration to the
enrolled students.11 Only three states (Kerala, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa),
responded to the policy by offering free meals in some regions while the rest
of the states did not respond to the policy at all.
After a 6 year lag in implementation, in late 2001, the Supreme Court
of India directed all states to implement this program within 6 months. In
practice, most states missed the new deadline and the implementation was
still staggered across and within states (across public schools). The states’
inaction with regards to policy implementation resulted in public campaigns
10Other states which introduced this program before 2001 had limited implementation
(see Vishwanathan 2003). Kerala had an opt-in program.
11Dry ration refers to the practice of giving uncooked wheat or rice on a monthly basis,
often based on the attendance of a pupil. Children received three kg of foodgrain per month
if they had 80 per cent attendance in school. However, the attendance criterion is not
strictly followed in practice.
54
expressing dissatisfaction with program implementation. As a result of these
internal protests and the Supreme Court’s order, the coverage of the program
increased steadily after 2001 (Table B.2 in appendix shows the timing of adop-
tion of policy for different states). Though there was no criterion dictating the
staggered implementation level of the program across states, various stud-
ies have noted that the idiosyncratic timing and level of implementation of
the mid day meal program was a combined function of organized campaigns
by civil society activists, continued scrutiny by the media, and political and
bureaucratic interest in the program (Jayaraman and Simroth 2011). Khera
(2006) notes that “in many states, improvements in MDMS are linked to an
increased political interest in the scheme”.
An important point to keep in mind for the purpose of this study is
the distinction between policy adoption and its implementation intensity. The
Supreme Court order made 2001 the effective year in which the policy was
announced for all states in the sample. Hence, I use 2001 as the year of policy
announcement. Since this announcement applied to all states, it is reasonable
to treat this policy as an exogenous variation to the states. According to
MDMS reports, by 2004, the program was fully or partially implemented across
all 28 states and the 7 union territories (UT) of India. However, the level of
implementation differed significantly across and within states. In other words,
states had differential percentage of public primary schools offering free meals
and different kind of meals - cooked or uncooked. The timeline and the states
relevant for this study is discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.
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The key objectives of the program included improving nutritional sta-
tus of children, increasing the school enrollment and reducing drop-out, at
least at the primary level. The secondary objectives of the program involved
greater social assimilation of children from different castes, religion and gender
(Chutani 2012). The rationale behind the program design was to incentivize
the children from poor families to attend school, instead of assisting parents in
home-production or their occupations, by providing them free lunch in school.
The availability of at least one nutritious meal a day during early childhood
was also aimed at curtailing malnutrition among children. This paper exam-
ines the performance of the program on its primary objective of increasing
enrollment at primary school level.
2.2 Data
This paper uses two different nationally representative individual-level
cross-sectional datasets: Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS), 2004-
05 (henceforth 2005), and National Family Health Survey (NFHS), 1998-99
(henceforth 1999). Figure 2.1 illustrates the timeline of the policy announce-
ment and implementation. As shown in the figure, two states, Tamil Nadu
and Gujarat, implemented the free cooked meal policy in the 1980s. Figure
2.1 also shows that after MDMS was initially announced in 1995, only 3 states
(Kerala, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh) responded to the announcement be-
tween 1995 and 2001. Since the exact implementation status of these states
during 1998-99 is unclear, I drop them from the sample. I also drop 3 small
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states (Goa, Nagaland and Sikkim) as they had 0 fraction treated in 2005.12
After dropping these 6 states, I have 19 states and 1 UT in my dataset (see
Figure 2.2).13 The results are similar if I add these states back to the sample.
Figure 2.1: Timeline for Mid Day Meal Policy and its Response
Note: Tamil Nadu originally introduced free school meal program at a small scale
in 1925 in rural areas, but it was expanded to cover the entire state in 1982.
The key independent variable, fraction of students in primary schools
receiving free mid day meal, is constructed using individual level IHDS dataset.
The survey contains information on whether or not a child received mid day
meals in school. I use this variable to construct the district-level fraction of
children enrolled in schools who received any (cooked or uncooked) free meals.
Using the IHDS data, Figure 2.3 plots the relationship between the district
12Kerala had an opt-in feeding program before 1995 and was, as suggested by the liter-
ature, the only state to significantly respond to the MDMS announcement in 1995. In the
case of Orissa, JS (2011) suggests that the implementation of the mid day meal program
started in 2001, but the NSS data statistics from Vishwanathan (2006) suggest that prior to
2001, a significant number of children between the ages of 7- 12 had access to school meals.
13The data is not available for any union territory except for Delhi (there are total 7 union
territories in India). Also, in 2000, the number of states in India increased from 25 to 28 as
three large states were split into 6 smaller states. In my sample I have combined the smaller
states to represent the pre 2000 structure of states.
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Figure 2.2: Treatment and control states
Note: This map reflects the states covered in the sample, states dropped from the
sample. Note that the map does not show any Union Territories (for which the data
is unavailable, except for Delhi).
net enrollment average and the fraction treated at district level for the sample
of children between 6-10 years of age. Net enrollment ratio is defined as the
number of students aged 6-10 years enrolled in school to the number of 6-
10 year-olds in the district. Figure 2.3 shows that net enrollment increases
with the fraction of students receiving free meals. This positive correlation
substantiates the evidence presented in the literature (Dreze and Kingdon
2001, Motkuri 2009). I build on this is correlation to examine the causal
impact of the free school lunches on enrollment in India.
Due to the lack of individual level information on free school meals in
the pre-program time period, I use the state-level fraction of children getting
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Figure 2.3: Relationship between district-level enrollment and fraction treated
Note: The sample is obtained from the IHDS data and includes 5-10 year-olds. The
district net enrollment ratio is defined as the number of students of age 5-10 years
enrolled in school to the number of 5-10 year-olds in the district. Fraction treated
is defined as proportion of students enrolled in public primary schools receiving free
mid day meals in a district.
free school meals presented in Vishwanathan (2006), calculated using the Na-
tional Sample Survey (NSS) 1999-2000. Since, for control states, the program
was introduced in the 1980s (long before the year of current study), I assume
that the change in fraction of schools providing free lunches from 1999 to 2000
is negligible. I use the ratio of district population to state population as weights
to create district level fraction treated from the state level statistics presented
in Vishwanathan (2006). For the treatment states, the fraction is effectively 0
in the pre-program period (see Table 2.1, Vishwanathan (2006)).14 An impor-
14For some states, the fraction treated was positive but very small (at most 2 percent).
Incorporating this variation in the level of initial fraction treated in treated states does not
change the results.
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tant point to note here is that in the pre-treatment period, the coverage of the
mid day meal was not 100 percent in the control states. Moreover, the fraction
treated was different across the two control states. Hence, the control states
also benefited from the new policy (maybe because additional funds from the
federal government facilitated better implementation), imposing a downward
bias on the ITT estimates. I correct for this bias using instrumental variable
analysis with fraction treated as the endogenous variable and the presence of
the policy as the instrument.
Other independent variables used in the analysis include child’s gender,
dummies for birth year, type of place of residence (rural or urban), household
size, number of children under-5 in the household, number of siblings, caste
and religion of the household head, and growth rate for state GDP (SGDP).
The SGDP variable is constructed using data collated from the state reports,
by the Planning Commission, Government of India.
The summary statistics for the treatment and control groups are pre-
sented in Table 2.1. The sample includes 6-17-year-olds who are either enrolled
in primary school or are out of school. The pre-treatment statistics suggest
that on average, the treatment group has a greater proportion of rural popu-
lation and larger household sizes than the control group. The control group
has higher state GDP growth rates compared to the treatment group. In the
analysis, I add all these observable characteristics to control for any systematic
differences between the control and treatment group.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable All Treated Group Control Group
Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd
Pre-Treatment (1999)
Age 9.59 2.83 9.60 2.83 9.54 2.82
Rural 0.68 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.56 0.50
State GDP 5.61 3.15 5.55 3.27 6.23 1.19
Male 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50
Household Size 7.45 3.67 7.55 3.74 6.37 2.63
SC/ST 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47
OBC 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.43 0.49
Hindu 0.71 0.45 0.70 0.46 0.89 0.32
Muslim 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.08 0.27
Christian 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.02 0.15
Uneducated mothers 0.66 0.47 0.66 0.47 0.58 0.49
Uneducated fathers 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.46
Number of Siblings 3.04 1.76 3.10 1.77 2.46 1.57
Fraction of Treated Districts 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.24* 0.15
Observations 37085 33830 3255
Post-Treatment (2005)
Age 9.42 2.59 9.43 2.60 9.26 2.47
Rural 0.67 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.52 0.50
State GDP 7.89 3.93 7.72 4.06 9.65 1.18
Male 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50
Household Size 6.33 2.37 6.38 2.39 5.82 2.15
SC/ST 0.29 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.25 0.43
OBC 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.49 0.50
Hindu 0.75 0.44 0.73 0.44 0.88 0.33
Muslim 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.10 0.30
Christian 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Uneducated mothers 0.54 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.43 0.49
Uneducated fathers 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.45 0.21 0.41
Number of Siblings 2.60 1.66 2.65 1.68 2.08 1.37
Fraction of Treated Districts 0.38 0.08 0.386† 0.08 0.42 0.06
Observations 17613 16085 1528
Notes:The sample includes children aged 6-10 years. The sample includes 19 states
and 1 UT, as the data is unavailable for the remaining 6 UTs and 5 states (Kerala,
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Goa, Sikkim and Nagaland) were dropped from the sample.
Panel A shows the the statistics based on NFHS 2 data for the pre-treatment year
(1999) and Panel B shows the statistics from IHDS data for the post treatment year
(2005). The Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) and Other Backward Classes
(OBC) reflect the disadvantaged population groups (for definition refer to footnote 4).
The State GDP (SGDP) growth rates are obtained from the data tables collated by
the Planning Commission, Government of India.
*The level of fraction treated in the two control states, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, was
41.5% and 12.7%, respectively.
†The level of fraction treated in the two control states, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, was
44% and 40.5% in 2005, respectively. 61
2.3 Estimation Strategy
To identify the causal impact of the free lunch offered in schools on
the probability of enrollment, I exploit the variation from the staggered adop-
tion of the MDMS across the states. A few pioneering states implemented
the program in the 1980s, while the others caught up after 2001. To estimate
the causal effect of the program on enrollment, I use two estimation strate-
gies: (i) difference-in-differences to estimate the ITT effect, (ii) instrumental
variable estimation to explicitly incorporate the differential level of program
implementation.
2.3.1 Intent-To-Treat Estimation
I use the exogenous policy variation across states and time to estimate
the intent-to-treat impact. Specifically, I compare the change (over time) in
outcomes among the states which recently got the free lunch program (treat-
ment group) to the states which always had the free lunch program (control
group). The estimating equation is as follows:
Yidst = α0 + α1Xidst + α2Postt + α
enrollTreats ∗ Postt + ψd + εidst (2.1)
where Yidst is a binary variable for whether the child i in district d at time t is
enrolled in school or not. Xidst are the individual level characteristics such as
age, gender, caste, place of residence, etc. Since different districts, across and
within states, might differ in terms of quality of governance, infrastructure,
etc., I control for district fixed effects (ψd). The binary variable Postt takes
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a value of 1 for 2004-05 and 0 otherwise. The indicator variable, Treats,
takes a value of 1 if the district is in a state which is in the treatment group
and 0 otherwise. The control group includes the two states (comprising of 25
districts) which had universal primary public school free lunch program, while
the other states (including 202 districts) constitute the treatment group. The
error terms εidst account for the effect of all unobserved variables that vary
across individuals, districts and time. The standard errors in this analysis are
clustered at district level.
The coefficient on Treats∗Postt, αenroll, measures the ITT effect of the
program implementation on the outcome variables, i.e. the average difference
in means between the treatment and control group.
The key identifying assumption of difference-in-differences approach is
that the time trend in the absence of MDMS would have been the same in
both treatment and control states. Ideally, to test this assumption, one would
use the data from pre-2001 years to compare trends in the treatment and
control states for the outcome variable. Due to lack of availability of such
data, I instead use publicly available state-level statistics for adult literacy
rate as an indicator of the general level of education to compare the time
trends in treatment and control states.15 Panel A of Figure 2.4 illustrates
that the trends in literacy rate for the treatment and the control groups are
parallel. The p-value for equality of slopes is 0.78, hence cannot reject the
15Source: Planning Commission, Government of India
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equality of slope. Similarly, Panel B of Figure 2.4 shows the state-wise trends
in infant mortality rate from 1997 to 2005 across the treatment and control
groups. It is interesting to note that the trends are parallel before as well as
after the policy was announced. This is not surprising because the policy did
not affect the infant mortality rate. Panel C of Figure 2.4 show that trends in
gross secondary enrollment are also parallel for the treatment and the control
group.16
Two important points to note in context of MDMS are: (1) given the
incomplete coverage in the control states during the pre-treatment period, the
control group also increased program outreach after the policy was announced,
and (2) the extent of implementation of the policy differed across and within
states due to factors such as bad governance, low political will, insufficient
budgetary allocations, etc. The ITT estimate does not address any of these
concerns and hence underestimates the true policy impact. To incorporate
these effects, I use instrumental variable estimation.
2.3.2 Instrumental Variable Analysis
One way to address the concern of the differential level of implemen-
tation across states is to use the level of policy implementation as the key
independent variable instead of the presence of policy, i.e., regress enrollment
on the fraction of children who received mid day meals, to capture the aver-
16The p-value for equality of slopes for infant mortality rate is 0.894 and for gross sec-
ondary enrollment is 0.472. Hence, we cannot reject the equality of slope for these trends.
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Figure 2.4: Trends of treatment and control group
Note: This Figure plots the trends in literacy rate, infant mortality rate, and gross
secondary enrollment rate for treated states and control states. Adult literacy rate
is the percentage of people aged 15 and above who can, with understanding, read
and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Data Source for Panel
A is Economic Survey (2012-2013), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.
Infant Mortality Rate is the ratio of infant (less than a year old) death per 1000
live births. Data go Panel B is obtained from Sample Registration System (SRS)
Bulletin, Volume 47 No.1 (Sep. 2013). Panel C denotes the trends in gross secondary
enrollment for treatment and control states. The sample in Panel C includes data
for 10 out of 18 control states.
age treatment effect. However, using the fraction of children who received the
treatment might introduce an endogeneity bias. Although the program was
launched nationally in 2001, the differential level of program implementation
across the states might reflect that more proactive states had better on-ground
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implementation of the policy. To address this endogeneity concern, I use the
presence of the policy as an instrument for fraction of schools offering free
meals. I take advantage of the aforementioned state and time variation to ap-
ply difference-in-differences technique to estimate the fraction of schools that
actually offered the free lunch in each district. I use this estimated fraction as
a measure of the extent of implementation to evaluate the impact of MDMS
on education outcomes among the children in India. Key assumptions for va-
lidity of the instrument are: (1) the instrument and the endogenous variable
are correlated, and (2) exclusion restriction. While the first assumption is
tested using the F-Statistic of the first stage, exclusion restriction is difficult
to test empirically. Since the policy was announced at the national level it
is plausible that the presence of policy does not affect the outcome variable
through any channel other than the fraction of schools offering free lunch,
maintaining the validity of the exclusion restriction. While it is not possible
to test for correlation between the unobservables and the instrument variable,
it is possible to check the correlation between the instrument and the observ-
able characteristics. If observable characteristics significantly correlated with
the instrument, then the exclusion restriction is less likely to hold. Table 2.2
shows that the observable characteristics do not significantly predict the pres-
ence of policy. Therefore, Table 2.2 provides suggestive evidence supporting
the exclusion restriction.
To estimate the impact of the intensity of treatment on enrollment, I
estimate the impact of fraction treated on probability of enrollment using the
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Table 2.2: Exogeneity of Policy
Rural Household Size Female SC ST
Treat*Post 0.066 -0.733*** 0.008 0.033 0.040
(0.081) (0.190) (0.028) (0.034) (0.026)
OBC SGDP Hindu Muslim Christian
Treat*Post 0.051 -1.144 0.023 -0.031 0.002
(0.049) (0.696) (0.029) (0.029) (0.007)
Other Mother’s Father’s Siblings Birth
Religions Educ Educ Year
Treat*Post 0.006 0.026 -0.017 0.078 0.319
(0.006) (0.030) (0.031) (0.085) (0.362)
Observations 54698 54698 54698 54698 54698
Notes: The sample includes 19 states and 1 UT. Each cell denotes the co-
efficient from a regression of observable Y on Treat*Post variable. Robust
standard errors (clustered at district level) are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
following equation:
Yidst = γ0 + γ1Xidst + γ2Postt + ρFractionTreateddt + ψd + µidst (2.2)
where FractionTreateddt is the fraction of individuals receiving free lunch in
primary schools in district d at time t and all other variables are the same
as in equation (1). I estimate equation (2) by two-stage least square (2SLS)
using the following as the first stage equation:
FractionTreateddt = β0 + β1Xidst + β2Postt +α
fracTreats ∗Postt +ψd + eidst
(2.3)
where Treats ∗ Postt is the instrument for FractionTreateddt.
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Note that ρ is interpreted as the local average treatment affect among
the compliers. Since in this case, the endogeneity is at an aggregated district
level, the compliance to the treatment is at the district level.17
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Findings
Table 2.3 presents the ITT and LATE estimates for gross and net en-
rollment in primary school and grade 1. All the specifications include demo-
graphic controls such as religion, parents’ education, household size, dummies
for birth year and district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level. Columns 1 and 2 present the results for gross and net enrollment
in primary school, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 present the results for gross
and net enrollment in grade 1, respectively. Panel A shows that the intent-
to-treat estimates are positive and significant for all the outcome variables.
In particular, the reduced form estimates suggest that MDMS increased the
probability of enrollment in primary school by 6 percentage points, and en-
rollment in grade 1 by 5-11 percentage points. Panel B shows the results from
instrumental variable strategy. The F-stat on the first stage shows that the
presence of the policy strongly predicts the fraction of children who receive
free meals in school. The first stage coefficient is below 1, which captures the
imperfect implementation of the policy. The LATE effects from Panel B show
17Since the model is exactly identified, the LATE estimate is the same as Wald estimator,




that a one percent increase in the fraction of students getting meals increases
the probability of primary school enrollment by about 0.25-0.26 percentage
points; hence full coverage by the policy would increase the probability of en-
rollment by 25-26 percentage points. Similarly, a full coverage by the policy
would increase the gross enrollment in grade 1 by 24 percentage points, and net
enrollment in grade 1 by 46.7 percentage points. This estimate translates into
a 32% increase in gross primary enrollment and 39% increase in gross grade
1 enrollment. Thus, the results of Table 2.3 show that the MDMS induced
a larger extensive response by getting out-of-school children into schools and
increasing enrollment in grade 1.
The dataset used does not allow for differentiation among the students
who drop-out of school and those who never enrolled. Also, it does not offer any
information about whether a student, who is older than the official age for the
grade that he/she is in, enrolled at an older age or has been repeating grades.
For example, the official age for grade 5 is 10 years, but a 12 year old could be
studying in grade 5 because either he/she started school at the age of 8 years or
he/she started school at 6 years of age but repeated grades for 2 years. Thus,
an increase in gross enrollment could result from more children going to school
(extensive margin response), reduced drop-out (intensive-margin response) or
more students repeating grades. While it is difficult to completely separate the
three components, I study the effect of the policy on on-time enrollment, i.e.
being on-track in school according to recommended grade-age combinations.
Table 2.4 presents a transition matrix that shows the effect on the policy on
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Table 2.3: Impact on Probability of Enrollment









Panel A: Reduced Form (ITT)
Treat*Post 0.057*** 0.063*** 0.050* 0.113**
(0.018) (0.022) (0.028) (0.051)
Panel B: IV (LATE)
First Stage
Treat*Post 0.232*** 0.239*** 0.207*** 0.241***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.033)
2SLS
Fraction Treated 0.245*** 0.262*** 0.244** 0.467***
(0.078) (0.076) (0.123) (0.174)
Demographic Controls X X X X
District Fixed Effects X X X X
F-Stat for First Stage 45.16 47.31 43.71 52.33
Fraction Treated Mean 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.12
Pre-Reform Enrollment
Mean
0.76 0.86 0.62 0.79
Observations 54687 37364 22701 7306
Notes: The sample includes 19 states and 1 UT. Demographic controls include type of resi-
dence, household size, number of children under 5 in the household, number of siblings, gender
of the child, birth year dummies, caste and religion of the household head, mother’s education
and father’s education. Robust standard errors (clustered at district level) are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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being enrolled in a particular grade at a specific age. Panel A of Table 2.4
shows that the ITT effect of MDMS on the probability of enrollment and
Panel B shows he LATE estimates. Table 2.4 shows that the MDMS policy
increased the on-time enrollment in all grades, and the LATE estimates are
much larger than the ITT estimates for all grades. The positive and significant
effect along the diagonal of the matrix suggests intensive margin response, i.e.
more children continuing education on-time as a result of the MDMS.18
2.4.2 Heterogeneity in Results
The evidence in the existing literature suggests that girls benefit more
than boys from the mid day meal program and the policy impact is also higher
for the more disadvantaged populations such as SC/STs or OBCs. To test this
hypothesis, Tables 2.5-2.6 show the heterogeneity in results by gender and with
caste.
The results from Table 2.5 suggest that the program impact is larger
for girls than boys. While the effect of the program is positive and significant
for both boys and girls, the effect for girls, on average, is more than twice as
large as the effect on boys. This difference in the magnitude is smaller for net
enrollment in grade 1. This suggests that while the program is effective in
increasing enrollment for all children, it has larger effects on girls in terms of
18Table 2.4 also shows that for some grades the probability of enrollment of older children
increased, but the magnitude of the effect was usually smaller. Given data constraints, it is
not possible to say whether this increase is due to children repeating grades, or enrollment
of out-of-school children back into schools due to the incentives of MDMS.
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Table 2.4: AgeXGrade Transition Matrix
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5
Panel A: Reduced Form (ITT)
6 years 0.11
(0.05)
7 years 0.05 0.11
(0.02) (0.06)
8 years 0.01 0.18 0.24
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
9 years -0.49 0.03 0.05 0.17
(0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
10 years or older 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.14 0.07
(0.12) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Panel B: 2SLS (LATE)
6 years 0.47
(0.13)
7 years 0.26 0.48
(0.10) (0.21)
8 years 0.10 0.88 0.86
(0.24) (0.19) (0.26)
9 years -4.01 0.19 0.23 0.70
(1.37) (0.30) (0.19) (0.25)
10 years or older 1.08 1.22 1.41 0.64 0.28
(0.88) (0.30) (0.20) (0.10) (0.11)
Notes: Each cell denotes coefficient for the effect of MDMS on probability of being enrolled
of a child of age X in grade Y. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients in bold are
significant at 10% or smaller level of significance.
continuing education at primary school level.
Table 2.6 presents the estimates for different castes. The results suggest
that the impact on disadvantaged populations (including SCs, STs and OBCs)
is statistically higher than the effect on other higher caste. A t-test does not
reject the equality of coefficients of SC/STs and OBC, but rejects the equality
of coefficients of SC/ST and other (higher) castes, and coefficient of OBC and
other castes at less than 0.1 percent level of significance. This heterogeneity
in results is not surprising as the disadvantaged groups belong to the more
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneity by Gender









Panel A: Reduced Form (ITT)
Girls*Treat*Post 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.094*** 0.128**
(0.018) (0.022) (0.029) (0.052)
Boys*Treat*Post 0.026 0.036* 0.013 0.098*
(0.018) (0.021) (0.027) (0.051)
p-value for equality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
Panel B: 2SLS (LATE)
Girls*Fraction Treated 0.351*** 0.354*** 0.350*** 0.511***
(0.081) (0.080) (0.129) (0.179)
Boys*Fraction Treated 0.139* 0.174** 0.116 0.419**
(0.081) (0.076) (0.123) (0.174)
p-value for equality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
Demographic Controls X X X X
District Fixed Effects X X X X
Mean Enrollment for Girls 0.72 0.83 0.55 0.77
Mean Enrollment for Boys 0.81 0.88 0.69 0.81
Observations 54687 37364 22701 7306
Notes: The sample includes 19 states and 1 UT. Demographic controls include type of resi-
dence, household size, number of children under 5 in the household, number of siblings, gender
of the child, birth year dummies, caste and religion of the household head, mother’s education
and father’s education. Robust standard errors (clustered at district level) are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.6: Heterogeneity by Caste









Panel A: Reduced Form (ITT)
SC/ST*Treat*Post 0.081*** 0.100*** 0.080*** 0.162***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.030) (0.052)
OBC*Treat*Post 0.085*** 0.089*** 0.083*** 0.139***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.029) (0.053)
Other Castes*Treat*Post 0.013 0.016 -0.003 0.059
(0.019) (0.023) (0.029) (0.051)
F-test for equality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: 2SLS (LATE)
SC/ST*Fraction Treated 0.310*** 0.368*** 0.335*** 0.616***
(0.081) (0.076) (0.122) (0.181)
OBC*Fraction Treated 0.334*** 0.339*** 0.347*** 0.540***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.121) (0.184)
Other Castes*Fraction
Treated
0.115 0.122 0.103 0.309*
(0.077) (0.078) (0.115) (0.178)
F-test for Equality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Demographic Controls X X X X
District Fixed Effects X X X X
Mean Enrollment for
SC/ST
0.73 0.82 0.58 0.73
Mean Enrollment for OBC 0.74 0.84 0.57 0.77
Mean Enrollment for Other
Castes
0.81 0.89 0.68 0.84
Observations 54687 37364 22701 7306
Notes: Notes: The sample includes 19 states and 1 UT. Demographic controls include type
of residence, household size, number of children under 5 in the household, number of siblings,
gender of the child, birth year dummies, caste and religion of the household head, mother’s
education and father’s education. Robust standard errors (clustered at district level) are in
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
impoverished sections of the populations and have low initial enrollment rates.
Thus, a larger response of the mid day meal program on these demographic
groups is in line with our expectations. These results also align well with the
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results of other MDMS studies (Jayaraman and Simroth 2011).
2.4.3 Placebo Test
To ensure that the results presented are not generated by chance, I per-
form a placebo test. Using data from control states and the states which were
excluded from the sample, I randomly assign treatment to the same ratio of
individuals as the original sample. Then I run the regressions for all the out-
comes using this new dataset and store the estimates. This process is repeated
500 times and the results are summarized in Figure 2.5. Figure 2.5 plots the
distribution of the estimates produced using the randomization and the ver-
tical line depicts the actual coefficient estimated using the original sample.
The figure shows that the true estimate is always above the 95th percentile of
the placebo distribution. Except for Panel C, none of the placebo regressions
estimated an effect which is larger than the actual estimates obtained in the
analysis. This presents strong evidence that my estimates showing that the
program led to an increase in probability of primary and grade 1 enrollment
are not generated by chance.
2.5 Discussion
The evidence presented in this paper emphasizes that the ITT effects
underestimate the true impact of a policy, especially if the program implemen-
tation is not uniform. The estimates for primary enrollment predict a 30-32%
increase in primary enrollment, which is higher than 13-23% effect found in
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Figure 2.5: Placebo Test
Note: Figure 4 plots the results for the Placebo regressions described in Section 5
for gross primary enrollment (Panel A), net primary enrollment (Panel B), gross
enrollment in grade 1 (Panel C) and net enrollment in grade 1 (Panel D). The figure
plots the distribution of placebo estimates generated using sample of states that
were either the control group or were excluded from the sample. The vertical red
line corresponds to the actual estimates from the analysis.
the literature. For enrollment in grade 1, the difference between the ITT and
LATE estimates is much larger. The estimates from Table 2.3 show a 39-59%
increase in the probability of enrollment in grade 1 compared to 15-36% en-
rollment increase found in the literature (Khera 2006). The large magnitude
of impact though surprising, is not completely out-of-line in context of South
Asian countries. A study by WFP showed over 100% increase in overall enroll-
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ment and about 200% increase in first grade enrollment of girls as a result of
a take-home ration program in Pakistan between 1998/99 and 2003/04 (WFP
Pakistan 2005). Moreover, unlike most existing studies that focus on children
already in school (Adelman, Gilligan, and Lehrer 2008), this paper uses in-
dividual level household survey data to the extensive margin response. The
large magnitude of LATE estimate for MDMS could be partially attributed to
the choice of the outcome variable. Enrollment response might be much higher
than the attendance response (outcome largely is studied in the literature) if
the officially enrolled students did not regularly attend classes.
2.5.1 Other Similar Policies
If other policies were introduced during 1999-2005 and affected treat-
ment and control states differentially, then the LATE estimate might capture
a combined effect of all such policies. A key contender for such a policy in
India is the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA). SSA was introduced in 2001-02 and
aimed to achieve universal elementary education. Most of the initiatives under
SSA were focused on providing a better quality of education. SSA program
implementation model included building new schools in regions with no pub-
lic schools, improving the existing infrastructure of the schools, hiring more
teachers and increasing grants for developing better course materials. Alterna-
tive schooling models such as the Alternative and Innovative Education (AIE)
centers, mobile schools and Education Guarantee Scheme (EGS) schools were
built to target out-of-school children.
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Though the timing and objective of SSA overlap with the MDMS, it is
unlikely that the SSA affected the treated and the control states differentially.
However, new school established under the SSA could have contributed to the
estimated increase in enrollment. A preliminary analysis of IHDS school level
data (2005) suggests that less than two percent of sample public schools were
opened after 2001. Also, the dataset used in this analysis does not include
any EGS schools. Therefore, the presence of new schools driving the estimates
seems unlikely. Nevertheless, it is plausible that the changes in infrastructure
introduced by SSA might have coincided with the introduction of mid day
meals in schools. To rule out this this concern, I rely on Jayaraman and Sim-
roth’s result, whereby they showed that schooling inputs such as classrooms,
water, electricity, blackboards, teachers, etc. did not change differentially at
the same time as the introduction of the mid day meal. To corroborate this,
I use the IHDS school level data (2005) to estimate a correlation between the
provision of free meals and school infrastructure in public schools. The results
suggest a correlation coefficient smaller than 0.12. These findings, together
with Jayaraman and Simroth’s results, suggest that it is unlikely that my es-
timates are capturing the impact of the combined effects of SSA and MDMS.
Another potential concern is that if the program was rolled out first in
districts with larger share of disadvantaged population, the impact estimated
may be local to the level of implementation. The margin for response to wel-
fare programs is higher in such backward districts. Thus, the impact estimate
might become smaller as the program expands to other districts. Figure 2.6
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plots the fraction treated against the fraction of disadvantaged population in
a district. As is evident from Figure 2.6, fraction treated does not vary sys-
tematically with the proportion of backward population in a district. Hence,
I do not find any evidence of systematic differences in implementation w.r.t.
population demographics of a district.
Figure 2.6: Relationship between fraction treated and proportion of disadvan-
taged population
Note: Disadvantaged population is defined as the proportion of population belonging
to the SC/ST/OBC group in a district. Fraction Treated is defined as the fraction
of population getting free meals in schools at the district level. The graph is plotted
for data in 2005 and sampling weights are used.
2.5.2 Back-of-the-Envelope
For any public policy or welfare program, it is important to weigh the
costs against benefits and assess its viability and sustainability. However, in
the case of education policy, it is difficult to measure the intrinsic social value
of universal education. In this section, I discuss the benefits of SFPs and
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present a rough estimate of benefit-to-cost ratio of the MDMS using some
back-of-the-envelope calculations.
The benefits from SFPs could be classified into three key categories:
direct benefits to the beneficiary, benefits to the family of the beneficiary, and
benefits to the society (externalities). Direct benefits to the beneficiary include
better health and education resulting in increased employment opportunities
in the future, higher productivity, better cognitive and non-cognitive skills and
improved psychological well-being (WFP, 2013). Benefits to the family include
reduced cost of schooling, reduced healthcare expenditure and household food
security (reduced expenditure on food). Beside these direct benefits, school
feeding programs have been associated with various indirect social benefits
such as gender equity, better literacy rates, less child labor, poverty alleviation,
and reduced crime rate (WFP, 2013). These indirect benefits are usually
difficult to measure, making it harder to precisely estimate a cost-benefit ratio.
For benefit calculations, I restrict my analysis to the benefit that ac-
crues from the increased expected wage resulting from a higher probability of
being educated. I use the National Sample Survey of India (NSS), 2004-05,
a nationally representative dataset, to obtain an estimate of benefit from in-
creased enrollment probability. I assume that enrollment into primary school
results in a positive probability of continuing education beyond first grade.
I calculate the probability of schooling, separately for different levels of ed-
ucation. I also estimate the daily wage of workers with different levels of
education. I use these estimates to obtain an expected value of the daily wage
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for males and females, conditional on enrolling in school. Using the estimates
from this paper, the back-of-the-envelope calculations provide an estimate of
expected annual wage benefit of about $14-17.19
The cost estimate is obtained by dividing the budgetary allocation for
MDMS by the number of beneficiaries in 2005. The annual per child cost
is estimated as $5.72. The resulting benefit to cost ratio is between 2.6:1 to
3:1, which is similar to the benefit-cost ratio of 4:1 derived in an analysis by
Boston Consulting Group and WFP.20 An important point to note here is that
these calculations do not account for any social benefits or benefits accruing to
the family and hence underestimate the true benefit of the program. Keeping
in mind that the benefit estimate is a lower bound for true benefits of the
program, the back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that MDMS is a cost-
effective and socially beneficial welfare policy.
2.6 Conclusion
Given the increasing popularity of school feeding programs in both de-
veloped and developing world, it is imperative to evaluate their impact to
facilitate policy decisions. This paper contributes to the existing literature on
impact evaluation of free lunch programs by explicitly incorporating the im-
plementation imperfections in the analysis. The empirical evidence presented
19The exchange rate used is 43.487INR for 1USD (2004 rate), available at http://www.
forecasts.org/data/data/EXINUS.htm
20Presentation available at http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/wfp208643.pdf
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suggests a positive and significant impact of the program on the probability
of primary school enrollment. The ITT effect estimates a 5.5% (7.3%) and
the LATE estimates a 32% (30%) increase in the gross (net) primary school
enrollment. Analysis of on-time enrollment suggests that the program had
a large effect on enrollment in grade 1, suggesting a large extensive margin
response. I also find that the effect is larger for the socially disadvantaged
groups as well as girls.
When interpreting the results, it is important to keep in mind the
limitations of this analysis. First, due to the lack of identifiers for type of
school (public or private) that the individual attends, the estimates might be
biased as the sample may assign students who are not treated (as they attend
private schools) to the treatment group. This will push the estimates towards
zero, underestimating the true impact. Second, this paper does not distinguish
between the different kinds of treatment - cooked meals versus uncooked meals,
which might affect enrollment incentives differently. Third, due to the lack of
data on attendance and cognitive outcomes such as test scores, the analysis
does not incorporate other important educational gains that might be accrued
from the program. It will be insightful to incorporate effects of differential




College Costs and Educational Choices of
Undocumented Immigrants: Evidence from
Texas 1
College cost is an important factor in post-secondary education deci-
sions. College costs not only influence enrollment but also affect other impor-
tant education decisions such as choice of major, type of degree, and timely
graduation (Leslie and Brinkman 1988, Cabera and Nasa 2000, Denning 2014).
These educational choices have long lasting effects on labor market outcomes,
health, marriage and personality traits (Oreopolous et al. 2009). Since dis-
advantaged socio-economic subgroups are particularly sensitive to the price of
college, changes in college costs can have a significant influence on their edu-
cation decisions (Flores 2010a). In this paper, I study the impact of reduced
college tuition on educational decisions of undocumented immigrants.
About 65,000 undocumented children, who were not born in the US
but have been living in the US for over five years, graduate from American
high schools every year.2 While 25-30 percent of all 16 to 24 year-olds enroll
1The conclusions of this research do not necessarily reflect the opinion or official position
of the Texas Education Research Center, the Texas Education Agency, the Texas Higher
Education Coordinating Board, the Texas Workforce Commission, or the State of Texas.
2Undocumented refers to a foreign-born person without proper authorization or legal
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in some college, only 10 percent of the undocumented immigrants in this age
group do so (The UndocuScholars Project Report, 2015). One explanation for
this enrollment gap is the high cost of postsecondary education. Unlike their
US-born peers, the children of undocumented immigrants do not qualify for
resident tuition, making college costs prohibitively high. In 2001, Texas be-
came the first state to pass a policy allowing in-state tuition to undocumented
immigrants (House Bill 1403). Currently, 20 states have legislation allowing
undocumented children to qualify for in-state tuition.3
In this paper I estimate the effect of changes in college costs resulting
from the in-state resident tuition reforms on educational decisions of undocu-
mented immigrants in Texas. Specifically, I employ a difference-in-differences
technique to estimate the impact of in-state tuition on probability of grad-
uation, type of degree and choice of major for undocumented immigrants.
Comparing undocumented Hispanic immigrants to the U.S. born Hispanics, I
find that the reduced college costs significantly increased the graduation rate
for undocumented immigrants enrolled in community colleges, but had no sig-
nificant impact on students in four-year universities. The policy increased the
probability of graduating with an associate degree or an advanced certificate,
and the probability of graduating with an academic major from community
colleges.4 I also find that the policy had a larger impact for males than fe-
basis of residence in the United States. I use the terms undocumented and unauthorized in-
terchangeably. The terms Latino and Hispanic are also used interchangeably. For additional
information on these terms, see Bean and Lowell (2007).
3Source: http://www.ncsl.org/documents/immig/InStateTuition_july212015.pdf
4Majors in community colleges are categorized into academic, technical or technical-prep
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males. The effect of the policy on timely graduation is sensitive to the choice of
specification. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the in-state
resident tuition policy reduced the gap in opportunities for higher education,
but its impact was primarily concentrated among students enrolled in com-
munity colleges.
This paper makes three important contributions to the literature. First,
this paper extends the analysis of the effect of in-state tuition policy beyond
enrollment to examine other important decisions such as major choice, degree
obtained, and timely graduation. Although the in-state resident tuition pol-
icy has received much attention from various fields, most of these studies are
qualitative in nature (Olivas 2004, 2008, Batalova and Fix 2006, Feder 2006,
Perry, 2006, Castillo 2007, Flores and Chapa 2009), and quantitative evidence
on the effect of such law changes on education outcomes is limited to enroll-
ment (Kaushal, 2008, Chin and Juhn 2010, Flores 2010a, b, Amuedo-Dorantes
and Sparber 2014, Potochnick 2014). Second, existing literature studying un-
documented immigrants suffers from high measurement error due to lack of
identifiers for the illegal immigration status in government surveys. Using
unique administrative data from Texas allows me to identify undocumented
immigrants with higher precision. Third, the existing literature has largely
examined the impact of the in-state tuition policy on enrollment outcomes in
any college, without distinguishing between the type of colleges and degrees
(Flores 2006, Chin and Juhn 2010). Given the substantial differences across
major.
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the cost of 2-year and 4-year public colleges, it is important to examine the
effect of the policy on different types of institutions separately. Thus, another
important contribution of this paper is to separate the effect of the policy
on different channels of postsecondary education, i.e. 4-year public university
degree and community colleges.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1 discusses the
institutional background details of the in-state tuition law of Texas. Section
3.2 discusses of the empirical strategy, followed by a description of the data
in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents the empirical results. Lastly, Section 3.5
concludes.
3.1 Institutional Background
Education attainment rates for undocumented immigrants are lower
than their US-born peers at all levels of education. Just 54 percent of undoc-
umented youth have at least a high school diploma, compared to 82 percent
for their US-born peers (Passel and Cohn, 2009). Among high school grad-
uates, only 5-10 percent enroll in postsecondary institutions, and far fewer
graduate with a degree (Department of Education Report, 2015). Financial
barriers have been noted as one of the key explanations for the low education
attainment among undocumented youth. Undocumented immigrants are inel-
igible for Title IV federal financial aid, making college education unaffordable
for them. To improve college access, some states and public universities have
passed policies allowing in-state resident tuition to undocumented youth.
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In 2001, House Bill 1403 was passed in the Texas Senate, which allowed
in-state resident tuition to any student that met the following criteria: (i) must
have graduated from a public or private high school or received an equivalent
of a high school diploma in Texas, (ii) must have resided in the state for at
least 3 years as of high school graduation date or the date when they received
equivalent of a high school diploma, (iii) must register as an entering student in
an institution of higher education not earlier than the 2001 fall semester, and
(iv) must provide the institution an affidavit stating that the individual will
file an application to become a permanent resident at the earliest opportunity
the individual is eligible to do so (HB 1403, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. [Tex. 2001]).
While the in-state tuition reform is aimed at reducing the gap in op-
portunity for education, it does not address the gap between returns to educa-
tion for undocumented immigrants and their U.S. born peers. The federal law
prohibits employers from hiring an undocumented immigrant, making their la-
bor market returns to college education lower compared to US-born students.
However, hiring an independent contractor without seeking proof of immigra-
tion is within the bounds of the legal framework. Thus, postsecondary degrees
which facilitate obtaining professional licenses for self-employment offer bet-
ter labor market opportunities for undocumented immigrants. Given that the
community colleges offer low-cost options of professional courses compared to
most 4-year universities, I expect a greater strategic response to the change in
college costs for students who attend community colleges.
Recent studies have found that the choice of major is sensitive to the
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price of college education (Stange 2012, Denning and Turley 2016). The cost
of college is a function of the total number of credit hours taken, and different
degrees/majors require a different number of credits. As a result, students face
differential pricing based on their major and degree choice. For instance, the
cost of getting an associate degree is substantially higher than getting a pro-
fessional certificate. These differences get accentuated if a student has to pay
nonresident tuition. Figure 3.1 plots the tuition costs for getting a certificate,
advanced technical certificate, and an associate degree. As shown in the fig-
ure, the nonresident tuition for a certificate course is very similar to in-district
tuition for an advanced technical certificate. Similarly, the nonresident tuition
for an advanced technical certificate is very similar to in-district tuition for an
associate degree. If students are financially constrained, qualifying for in-state
resident tuition could allow them to afford previously unaffordable degrees.
To illustrate this point, consider a student whose financial affordability is rep-
resented by line A. In the absence of in-state tuition policy, this student can
at best afford an advanced technical certificate, but cannot afford an associate
degree. However, with the in-state tuition policy, this student can now afford
to get an associate degree. Thus, the change in college costs would not only
affect enrollment, but are likely to influence the choice of degrees for students
enrolled in colleges. In Section 3.4, I analyze the impact of the in-state tu-
ition law on the probability of graduating with different types of degrees and
majors.
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Figure 3.1: Trends in College Tuition
Notes: This figure plots the trends in average college tuition for different degrees/certificate
in Texas community colleges over time period 1997-2014. The solid lines represent average
in-district tuition and dashed lines represent average nonresident tuition. The green series
with circles shows average tuition costs for associate degree, with an average requirement of
60 semester credit hours (SCH). The red series with triangles shows average tuition costs for
advanced technical certificates, with an average requirement of 30 SCH. The blue series with
diamonds shows average tuition costs for basic certificates, with an average requirement of
15 SCH. Source: Statistics from Texas Association of Community Colleges.
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3.2 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the causal effect of the tuition changes on educational
choices, I employ the difference-in-differences technique using US-born His-
panics as the control group and the undocumented Hispanic immigrants as
the treatment group. This empirical method will allow me to separate the
time trends of the educational outcomes that would have existed in the ab-
sence of the policy. I estimate the following equation:
Yit = α0 + α1Xit + Postt + UIi + Postt ∗ UIi + eit (3.1)
Where Yit is the educational outcome for individual i at time t. The outcomes
studied include probability of graduation, probability of graduating on time,
graduating with an associate degree, an advanced certificate, or a basic skill
certificate, and choice of major. Xit is a vector of control variables which
includes an indicator for academic disadvantage, disability, if they are single
parent, gender, age, limited English proficiency, and dummies for institute
and year.5 Postt is an indicator that takes value of 1 for years after the
in-state policy was introduced, i.e., 2001 onwards, and 0 otherwise. UIi is
a variable used to identify if an individual is an undocumented immigrant.
Identifying undocumented immigrants in the sample has been one of the long-
standing limitations of the existing literature. In the literature, undocumented
immigrants are usually defined as those individuals who are not US citizens.
5Academic disadvantage is an indicator variable which captures whether a student has
college entry level skills in reading, writing or math, based on a local placement test.
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In this paper, I use the following alternative definitions for the undocumented
immigrant variable.
Definition 1: UIi is as an indicator which takes the value of 1 for inter-
national Hispanic students who would pay nonresident tuition in the absence
of the policy, and 0 for all other Hispanic students.6 This definition is similar
to the one used in the literature and categorizes all immigrants (documented
as well as undocumented) as undocumented immigrants.
Definition 2: UIi is defined as a predicted probability of being undoc-
umented. Section 3.3 describes how this predicted probability is calculated.7
3.3 Data
In this paper, I use the individual-level administrative data collected
by the Texas Education Resource Center (ERC). The ERC sources data from
the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB), which includes
detailed information on the tuition status, waivers, majors, degree awarded,
and demographic information for all students at Texas community colleges
and public universities. Unlike the survey data used in the existing literature,
the ERC administrative data has the unique advantage of identifying undoc-
umented immigrants using markers for in-state tuition eligibility under the
6For years prior to 2001, these are students who paid nonresident tuition and after 2001,
this includes students who pay nonresident or in-state under HB 1403.
7I use another definition in which UI is an indicator that takes value of 1 if the predicted
probability of being undocumented is greater than 0.5, and 0 otherwise. The results (not
presented here) are similar in sign and significance.
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House Bill 1403, which is usually utilized for undocumented immigrants.
For my analysis sample, I use the students who enrolled as freshman
in public colleges between 1995-2013 for community colleges, and 1995-2011
for four-year public universities.8 I restrict my primary sample to include only
Hispanics. Undocumented Hispanics constitute the treatment group and US
born Hispanics form the control group. For year 2001 onwards, the data in-
cludes an identifier for individuals who are exempted from nonresident tuition
under HB1403. Using the status of the tuition paid, I classify Hispanic stu-
dents into US born (if they pay resident tuition) and undocumented Hispanics
if they pay resident tuition under HB 1403. However, this identifier is available
only after the year 2001.
To be able to classify students into different categories by residency
status for the entire time-period (1995-2011), I predict the probability of a
Hispanic student being an immigrant based on their place of residence, age
intervals, whether they have a valid social security number, and whether they
are internationals who pay or would have paid nonresident tuition in the ab-
sence of the policy.9,10 I regress the subsample of years 2001-2013, for which I
8While the data is also available for students who enrolled until 2015, I use the infor-
mation on students who are scheduled to graduate by 2015. Thus, for two-year colleges, I
use data for students enrolled up until 2013, and for four-year universities, I use data for
students enrolled up until 2011.
9Place of residence variable includes dummies for counties for those living in border
counties, a dummy for those who live in non-bordering Texas counties, a dummy for students
from Mexico, a dummy for international students, and a dummy for non-Texas US resident.
10As per the Social Security Administration, an individual needs to be a citizen or a
documented immigrant to receive a social security number. In 2012, Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) allowed temporary work permits to be given to undocumented
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have identifiers for undocumented immigrants, on these parameters, and then
use the estimated coefficients to predict the probability of being undocumented
for the entire sample. Panel A of Table 3.1 shows that the summary statistics
for these characteristics for undocumented and US born Hispanic students. As
is evident from this table, undocumented immigrants are more likely to not
have a social security number and are more likely to be from Mexico than US
born Hispanics.11
Note that the sample used only includes individuals who are already
enrolled in college. Hence, the analysis of educational choices of undocu-
mented immigrants is conditional on enrollment. According to the literature,
the in-state resident tuition policy increased enrollment in college. Although
I cannot estimate the effect of the in-state tuition law on enrollment because
of data constraints, summary statistics from the data show that share of un-
documented immigrants in community colleges increased from 0.5 percent in
2001 to 5.2 percent in 2013. Given the increase in share of undocumented
immigrants in colleges, there is a concern that compositional effects could be
driving the results. While I add demographic controls to alleviate this concern,
the results should be interpreted with caution.
immigrants who moved to the US as children. My results remain similar if I exclude the
students who were enrolled in college after DACA was passed.
11To confirm that this model reasonable predicts the probability of being undocumented,
I used a random 80 percent subsample for the 2001-2013 period to run the model, and
used the estimated coefficients to predict the probability of the remaining 20 percent of the
sample. This analysis found that anyone who had a predicted probability of higher than






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The key assumption in this analysis is that in the absence of a pol-
icy change, the US-born Hispanics will follow the same trend in their edu-
cational choices as that of the undocumented immigrants. To check whether
the US-born Hispanics are a reasonable control group, Table 3.1 provide sum-
mary statistics of the observable characteristics of undocumented immigrants
as well as US-born Hispanics. Panel B of Table 3.1 shows that the students
from both the subgroups are similar in observable characteristics, except that
undocumented Hispanic immigrants are younger and are more likely to be aca-
demically disadvantaged. In the analysis, I will control for all these observable
characteristics.
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 plot trends in the outcome variables for US-
born Hispanics and undocumented students enrolled in community colleges.
Figure 3.2 shows the trend for undocumented immigrant based on Definition 1,
i.e., all non-citizens are assumed to be undocumented immigrants. For Figure
3.3, I use the predicted probability of being undocumented as per Definition 2.
If the probability of being undocumented exceeds the sample mean of the pre-
dicted probability, then the student is categorized undocumented immigrant,
and s/he is otherwise categorized as a US-born Hispanic. As shown in these
figures, prior to the policy change, the trends for educational choices of undoc-
umented Hispanic immigrants are similar to those of the US-born Hispanics,
supporting the aforementioned parallel trend assumption. The probability
of graduation, probability of graduating with associate degree and basic cer-
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tificate for undocumented immigrants jumps at 2001, when the policy was
implemented. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 suggest that the reduced tuition costs re-
duced educational gaps of undocumented immigrant students in community
colleges.12
3.4.1 College Completion
Table 3.2 shows the results for estimating equation. The regressions
include demographic controls such as age, gender, academic disadvantage,
limited English language proficiency, and year fixed effects. Panel A shows
the regression results using the first definition of undocumented immigrants,
where any international student paying nonresident tuition is recorded as an
undocumented immigrant. Panel B shows the results using Definition 2, i.e.,
the predicted probability of being an undocumented immigrant. Column 1
shows that the in-state tuition policy increased the probability of graduation
for undocumented immigrants enrolled in community colleges by 12-14 pp. In
contrast, Column 3 of Table 3.2 shows that the policy had no economically or
statistically significant effect on the completion of degrees from four-year col-
leges. Given the larger cost and the lower returns of a four-year college degree
for undocumented immigrants, it is not surprising that the in-state tuition
policy did not have any impact on completion of four-year college degree.
The estimates for probability of graduating on time shown in Column
2 and Column 4 are sensitive to the definition of the key independent variable.
12Plots for four-year public universities are similar and available upon request.
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Figure 3.2: Trends for US-born Hispanics and Undocumented Immigrants
(Based on Definition 1)
A: Graduation B: On-Time Completion
C: Graduating with Associate Degree D: Graduating with Adv Certificate
E: Graduating with Basic Certificate F: Graduating with Academic Major
Notes: This figure plots the time trends in the outcomes for US born Hispanics and the
undocumented Hispanic immigrants enrolled in community colleges. Undocumented im-
migrants in this figure are defined using Definition 1, i.e., as all US noncitizens who paid
nonresident tuition are categorized as undocumented immigrants.
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Figure 3.3: Trends for US-born Hispanics and UI (Based on Definition 2)
A: Graduation B: On-Time Completion
C: Graduating with Associate DegreeD: Graduating with Adv Certificate
E: Graduating with Basic CertificateF: Graduating with Academic Major
Notes: Undocumented immigrants in this figure are defined based on the predicted proba-
bility of being undocumented calculated using region dummies, valid social security number,
age interval for the student, and whether they are internationals who pay or would have paid
nonresident tuition in the absence of the policy. The students who predicted probability is
equal to or higher than the sample mean are categorized as undocumented immigrants, and
others are categorized as US-born Hispanics.
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Table 3.2: Regression Results







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: UI is defined as US noncitizens
Post 2001*UI 0.139*** -0.005 0.007 -0.083***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016)
UI -0.114*** 0.143*** -0.146*** 0.244***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012)
Mean of Dep Var 0.14 0.25 0.31 0.71
Panel B: UI is defined using Predicted Probability of
Undocumented Immigrants
Post 2001 * UI 0.122*** -0.037*** -0.005 -0.023
(0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.020)
UI -0.158*** 0.186*** -0.273*** 0.189***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016)
Mean of Dep Var 0.27 0.10 0.42 0.60
Observations 1687230 429091 332025 139159
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. Demographic controls include: student’s
age and gender, an indicator for academic disadvantage, an indicator for whether they are
a single parent, diability, English language proficiency, and dummies for institute and year.
For Columns 3-4, demographic controls do not include an indicator for academic disad-
vantage, an indicator for whether they are a single parent, diability and English language
proficiency. Each Column correspond to an outcome. In Panel A, UI is defined as an in-
dicator for US noncitizens, and in Panel B, UI is defined as the predicted probability of
being an undocumented immigrant. Columns 1-2 use a sample of freshman year students
enrolled in community colleges during 1995-2013. Columns 3-4 use a sample of freshman
year students enrolled in four-year public universities during 1995-2011. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
Panel A shows a statistically insignificant effect of the policy on graduating
from community colleges, but a negative effect of the policy on on-time com-
pletion of a bachelor degree. Panel B shows that the in-state tuition policy
99
had a negative and significant impact on on-time graduation from community
college of students with higher likelihood of being undocumented immigrants,
but no significant effect on on-time graduation from four-year public univer-
sities. While the precision of the estimates is sensitive to the definition, the
results suggest that the in-state resident tuition had a negative effect on on-
time graduation. An explanation for this could be compositional effects. For
instance, it is possible that the reduced college tuition increased the number of
financially constrained students. These students might drop out of school for
semesters to support families, which could result reduced on-time graduation.
More detailed data will be required to understand what is driving the negative
effect on-time graduation.
3.4.2 Type of Degree
Table 3.3 shows the regression results for students who graduated from
community colleges. The estimates suggest that the in-state tuition policy
increased the probability of graduating with an associate degree or an advance
certificate for undocumented immigrants, and reduced the probability of grad-
uating with a basic level-1 certificate. As mentioned earlier, Figure 3.1 shows
that the in-state tuition policy significantly reduced the cost differential across
different college degrees, which may have allowed some students to afford pre-
viously unaffordable degrees. The results shown in Table 3.3 are consistent
with this expectation that as college costs decreases, students start opting for
advanced certificates or associate degrees.
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Panel A: UI is defined as US noncitizens
Post 2001*UI 0.059*** 0.005 -0.064***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009)
UI 0.054*** -0.008** -0.047***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.008)
Mean of Dep Var 0.77 0.02 0.21
Panel B: UI is defined using Predicted Probability of
Undocumented Immigrants
Post 2001*UI 0.067*** 0.008* -0.075***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.010)
UI 0.025** -0.011*** -0.014
(0.010) (0.003) (0.009)
Mean of Dep Var 0.70 0.05 0.25
Observations 429091 429091 429091
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. Demographic controls include: student’s
age and gender, an indicator for academic disadvantage, an indicator for whether they
are a single parent, diability, English language proficiency, and dummies for institute and
year. Each Column correspond to an outcome. In Panel A, UI is defined as an indicator
for US noncitizens, and in Panel B, UI is defined as the predicted probability of being an
undocumented immigrant. Sample includes freshman year students enrolled in community
colleges during 1995-2013. Columns 1-3 show the probability of graduating with an associate
degree, advanced certificate and a basic certificate, respectively. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
3.4.3 Choice of Major
Majors in community colleges are categorized into academic major or
technical major.13 Table 3.4 shows the effect of the in-state tuition policy
13A third category, technical-prep major, is included in technical major category for the
purpose of this study.
101
Table 3.4: Dependent Variable: Probability of Choosing Academic Major
Community College 4-year Public University
Acadmic Major STEM
(1) (2)
Panel A: UI is defined as US noncitizens




Mean of Dep Var 0.53 0.31
Panel B: UI is defined using Predicted Probability of
Undocumented Immigrants




Mean of Dep Var 0.49 0.19
Observations 429,091 139,159
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. Demographic controls include: student’s
age and gender, an indicator for academic disadvantage, an indicator for whether they
are a single parent, diability, English language proficiency, and dummies for institute and
year. Each Column correspond to an outcome. In Panel A, UI is defined as an indicator
for US noncitizens, and in Panel B, UI is defined as the predicted probability of being an
undocumented immigrant. Columns 1 uses a sample of freshman year students enrolled in
community colleges during 1995-2013. Column 2 uses a sample of freshman year students
enrolled in four-year public universities during 1995-2011, and does not include the following
demographic controls: an indicator for academic disadvantage, an indicator for whether they
are a single parent, diability and English language proficiency. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
on choice of major. Column 1 shows the probability of graduating with an
academic major, and Column 2 shows the probability of choosing a STEM
major at a 4-year university. The estimates show that in-state tuition policy
resulted in an increase in probability of graduating with an academic major for
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undocumented immigrants enrolled in community colleges but had no dignifi-
cant impact on the probability of graduating with STEM major from a 4-year
university.
3.4.4 Heterogeneity in Results
Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 show the heterogeneity in results by gender.
Table 3.5 suggests that the policy had a larger effect on graduation rate of male
compared to female undocumented immigrants at community colleges as well
as four-year universities. However, the effect of the policy on on-time gradua-
tion was larger for females compared to male undocumented immigrants.
Table 3.6 shows that in-state tuition policy had a larger effect on educa-
tional choices of males than females. Male undocumented students were more
likely to graduate, and graduate with associate degree or advanced certificates
after the policy than female undocumented immigrants.
3.5 Conclusion
In light of recent reforms and debates concerning educational and la-
bor market opportunities of undocumented immigrants, the question of how
financial incentives affect their educational outcomes is important. This paper
studies the effect of an in-state resident tuition policy in Texas on educational
choices of undocumented immigrants. Using alternative specifications, I find
that reduced college costs in community colleges, resulting from the in-state tu-
ition policy, lead to an increase in the likelihood of graduation, the probability
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Table 3.5: Heterogeneity in Results







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: UI is defined as US noncitizens
Post 2001 * UI* Male 0.014*** -0.030*** 0.032** -0.011
(0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.019)
Post 2001 * UI 0.132*** 0.009 -0.010 -0.078***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018)
UI -0.114*** 0.143*** -0.146*** 0.245***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012)
Male -0.042*** 0.017*** -0.089*** -0.044***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Panel B: UI is defined using Predicted Probability of
Undocumented Immigrants
Post 2001 * UI* Male 0.033*** -0.021*** 0.078*** -0.008
(0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.022)
Post 2001 * UI 0.106*** -0.027** -0.046*** -0.019
(0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.022)
UI -0.158*** 0.186*** -0.273*** 0.189***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016)
Male -0.043*** 0.016*** -0.090*** -0.043***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 1687230 429091 332025 139159
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. Demographic controls include: student’s
age and gender, an indicator for academic disadvantage, an indicator for whether they are
a single parent, diability, English language proficiency, and dummies for institute and year.
For Columns 3-4, demographic controls do not include an indicator for academic disad-
vantage, an indicator for whether they are a single parent, diability and English language
proficiency. Each Column correspond to an outcome. In Panel A, UI is defined as an in-
dicator for US noncitizens, and in Panel B, UI is defined as the predicted probability of
being an undocumented immigrant. Columns 1-2 use a sample of freshman year students
enrolled in community colleges during 1995-2013. Columns 3-4 use a sample of freshman
year students enrolled in four-year public universities during 1995-2011. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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Panel A: UI is defined as US noncitizens
Post 2001 * UI* Male 0.115*** 0.010*** -0.125***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
Post 2001 * UI 0.004 0.001 -0.004
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009)
UI 0.055*** -0.008** -0.047***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009)
Male -0.118*** -0.008*** 0.127***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel B: UI is defined using Predicted Probability of
Undocumented Immigrants
Post 2001 * UI* Male 0.095*** 0.012*** -0.106***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
Post 2001 * UI 0.022* 0.003 -0.024*
(0.010) (0.003) (0.010)
UI 0.026** -0.011*** -0.015
(0.010) (0.003) (0.009)
Male -0.119*** -0.009*** 0.127***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 429091 429091 429091
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. Demographic controls include: student’s
age and gender, an indicator for academic disadvantage, an indicator for whether they
are a single parent, diability, English language proficiency, and dummies for institute and
year. Each Column correspond to an outcome. In Panel A, UI is defined as an indicator
for US noncitizens, and in Panel B, UI is defined as the predicted probability of being an
undocumented immigrant. Sample includes freshman year students enrolled in community
colleges during 1995-2013.Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p
< 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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of graduating with an associate degree or an advanced certificate compared to
a basic certificate, and the probability of graduating with an academic major.
The evidence presented in this paper shows that reducing the gap in
opportunities for higher education can result in improved educational outcomes
for disadvantaged population groups. However, inadequate effort on the labor
market integration of undocumented immigrants can restrict the benefits from
any policy aimed at reducing the educational achievement gap. As shown in
this paper, a reduction in college costs only affected the education outcomes of
those enrolled in community college, but not in four-year public universities.
One of the reasons for this differential impact could be that four-year college
costs, even after allowing for in-state resident tuition, remain prohibitively
high for undocumented immigrants. Another plausible explanation is that
the returns to four-year college degree are not very high for undocumented
immigrants due to their restrictive legal employment channels. Future research
on the effect of in-state tuition policies on labor market outcomes will be






Appendix to Chapter 1
The primary sample for the analysis is created using the District Level
Household Survey (DLHS) for the year 2002-04 and 2007-08. The survey
includes information about the birth and immunization history of the last two
live births of all married women in the age group 15-44 (for 2004-05) and 15-49
(for 2007-08) who live in the household.
Restrictions based on Children’s Characteristics
1. Since the reference period for data on deaths and births within the house-
hold is 3 years, I restrict the sample to include children who are 3 years
old or younger.
2. I exclude children who were born during the same month as the death. I
do this because I do not have the exact date of birth or death. Thus, for
children born during the same month as the death, I cannot determine
whether the child was born before or after the death. My estimates are
similar if I include these observations in the sample.
3. I also exclude children who are born either one month before or one-
month after the death. This allows for some grieving time. The results
are similar but less precise when I include these children in the sample.
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Restrictions based on Household Characteristics
1. I exclude from the analysis households that do not identify a grandparent
as a current resident and that record no deaths of any old household
member. I do this because in these cases I cannot separate households in
which the grandparents are alive but live separately in another household
from households in which the grandparents died prior to the reference
period. Households that do not identify a grandparent as a current
resident and record no deaths of an old member constitute a 42 percent
of the total sample.
2. I only focus on households in which a death results in a structural shift
in the household compositionthat is, when household composition shifts
from a 3-generation unit to a 2- generation unit. Thus, the control group
consists of households in which one grandparent is alive while the treat-
ment group consists of households in which the only living grandparent
died during the reference period.
3. I drop households that have grandparents who are less than 50 years of
age. I do this because if a household member younger than 50 died, it
is difficult to isolate whether s/he was a grandparent. The IHDS sample
suggests the grandparents are usually over 50 years of age.
4. I drop households that have only 2 members.
5. I exclude visiting members and households in which women live in their
natal homes.
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6. I exclude households in which both grandparents died during the refer-
ence period. I do this because there are few such households and most
have received very sparsely spaced death shocks.
Imputed Grandparent’s Death: The survey provides detailed infor-
mation about the members who live in a household, including their relationship
to the household head, age, gender, etc. With regards to the death history,
the survey provides information about the month and year of death and the
gender and age of the deceased, but it does not identify his/her relationship to
the head of the household. To address this data constraint, I impute whether
the deceased was a grandparent based on the gender and age of the deceased
and the gender, age and his/her relationship to the head of the household of
the living members. For instance, if a 55 year-old women has died and the
current head of the household is a 60 year-old grandfather whose oldest son is
35, then I conclude that the women who died was the grandmother.
To check the accuracy of this imputation, I use IHDS data which in-
cludes information on the relationship of the deceased to the head of the house-
hold. I use the imputation algorithm to predict whether the deceased is the
grandparent using IHDS data. The correlation between the predicted rela-
tionship and the true relationship (whether the deceased is a grandparent) is
0.9979. This confirms that my imputed indicator for the deceased being a
grandparent is very accurate.
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Other Robustness Checks: The humped shape of the data in Figure
A.1 is by construction and can be explained using a simple example. For
instance, if the deaths and births were noted only for 6 months before the
survey and the survey was taken on 1st July, the number of children born one
month before and one month after the death will be greater than the number
of children born 5 months before or after the death. This is so because for a
family that experienced a death in May, the children born two months after the
death will not be observed in the data; in contrast, in families that experienced
death in April, children born three months after the death will not be observed
in the data. Thus, given the constant reference period, the probability of being
included in the survey is higher if the birth occurred close to the date of the
death; in other words, the probability of being in the data is inversely related
to the length of time that has passed since the date of death.
To confirm that the data structure is not driving the estimates, I create
a balanced panel for a children who were born 15 months before or after the
death. Figure A.1 shows the frequency of births for the sample of households
that experienced the death of the last living grandparent. As shown in the
figure, the observations are randomly distributed in this new balanced panel.
I also run my primary regressions using this balanced sample. The estimates
from this new sample (not shown here) vary in magnitude and significance



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.2: Summary Statistics
All Households in Mothers with at
Households Analysis Sample least two births
(All Mothers) during reference
period
Panel A: Household Characteristics
Rural 0.77 0.77 0.79
Hindu 0.75 0.78 0.77
Muslim 0.14 0.14 0.15
Christian 0.06 0.04 0.04
SC 0.19 0.19 0.21
ST 0.18 0.14 0.14
OBC 0.39 0.41 0.42
Household Size 6.78 7.05 6.85
Number of DILs 1.27 1.27 1.27
Rank of DILs 1.16 1.16 1.15
Number of Adult Males 1.82 1.76 1.77
Number of Adult Females 1.86 2.11 2.09
Age of Mother at Birth 24.60 24.73 23.80
Age of Grandparent 61.19 62.47 62.00
Male Child 0.52 0.53 0.50
Age of Child (in months) 18.20 18.27 18.43
Child Birth Order 2.79 2.76 2.93
Mother’s Schooling 8.35 8.44 7.85
Father’s Schooling 8.99 8.98 8.58
Panel B: Sample Variation
Born after Death 0.01 0.07 0.06
Death of last living
grandparent
0.03 0.14 0.12
Observations 345,741 62,772 15,909
Notes: Column 1 includes all households irrespective of their household structure: whether
or not the grandparent is present and whether or not there was a death in the family.
Columns 2 and 3 include households in which either the last living grandparent died during
the reference period or was alive and resided in the same household. Column 2 includes
married women who had at least one birth during the reference period, while Column 3
includes married women who had at least two births during the reference period. Scheduled
Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and other backward classes (OBC) denote the caste
classifications of India.
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Table A.3: Causes of Death - IHDS Sample
Percentage of













Notes: This table shows the summary statistics for the cause of death of grandparents
drawn from the Indian Human Development Survey data for 2004-05. The first column
shows the distribution of the causes of death for all responses. The second column shows
the distribution of the causes of death for all responses except those that stated “other.”
This table shows that most grandparents die as a results of short-term illnesses or accidents.
Table A.4: Household Structure
No GP Died One GP Died Two GP Died
No GP in Household Not in Sample
One GP in Household Control Group Treated Group
Two GP in Household Robustness Robustness Not in Sample
Notes: This table shows which household structures are included in the sample. Rows
show the household structure at the beginning of the reference period and Columns show
the number of deaths during the reference period. Each cell denotes whether a particular
combination of household composition and deaths during the reference period was included
in the sample. For instance, Column 1 and Row 1 shows that households in which there
were no grandparents and no one died are not included in the sample.
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Table A.5: Effect of Death- One of the Two Living Grandparents Die
(1) (2)
Born after Death -0.043* -0.047*
(0.024) (0.024)
Death of a Grandparent 0.012
(0.030)
Demographic Controls X X
Birth order dummies X X
Birth year dummies X X






Notes: Sample includes mothers who had two or more births during the reference period.
The treated group includes households in which one of the two living grandparents die,
while in the control households grandparents are alive. The unit of observation is the child.
Demographic controls include the childs gender, child age dummies, whether the child is a
first male child, whether the child is the first born, the mothers age at birth, paternal and
maternal education, whether the father lives in the household, the rank of the mother, the
death of an older child, the number of daughters-in-law in the household, the presence of old
individuals other than grandparents, the imputed age of grandparents, household size, the
number of children born during the reference period, the type of residence (rural or urban),
religion, the caste of the head of the household, the number of adult males, the number
of adult females, primary sampling unit (PSU) fixed effects, and interaction of survey year
and survey month dummies. PSU is defined as a village for rural areas, and a census block
for urban areas. Column (1) shows results from the estimation strategy 1, which includes
an indicator for the death of the last living grandparent and another indicator for the child
being born after the death of the grandparent. Column (2) presents results from empirical
strategy 2, which includes mother-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the PSU
level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A.6: Heterogeneity by Gender of Grandparent and Grandchild
(1) (2)
Born after Death*Female*GM 0.093** 0.119***
(0.042) (0.044)
Born after Death*Female*GF -0.019 -0.001
(0.033) (0.034)
Born after Death*Male*GM 0.008 -0.002
(0.041) (0.040)








Death of Grandparent*Female 0.039 0.014
(0.029) (0.028)
Death of Grandparent 0.030
(0.047)
Demographic Controls X X
Birth order dummies X X




Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for vaccinations at birth. GM denotes the house-
holds in which either the grandmother died or is the living grandparent. The treated group
includes families in which the last living grandparent died, while the control group includes
families in which exactly one grandparent is alive. Column (1) shows results from an esti-
mation strategy that includes an indicator for the death of the last living grandparent and
another indicator for the child being born after the death of the grandparent. Column (2)
presents results from empirical strategy 2, which includes mother-fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the PSU level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
p-value for BornAfterDeath*Female*GM = BornAfterDeath*Male*GM is 0.0293.
p-value for BornAfterDeath*Female*GM = BornAfterDeath*Female*GF is 0.0254.
p-value for BornAfterDeath*Male*GM = BornAfterDeath*Male*GF is 0.1001.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Born after Death 0.052** 0.050* 0.168
(0.026) (0.026) (0.212)
Death of Grandparent 0.058 0.054 0.030
(0.045) (0.048) (0.144)
Mean of Dep Var 0.059 0.058 0.462
Observations 12,373 12,373 1,668
Panel B
Born after Death*Years since Death 0.021 0.021 0.042
(0.015) (0.015) (0.036)
Death of Grandparent 0.071 0.062 0.013
(0.049) (0.048) (0.144)
Mean of Dep Var 0.059 0.058 0.462
Observations 12,373 12,373 1,668
Notes: This table shows the regression results for a modified vaccination at birth index,
which includes only the Oral Polio Vaccine and BCG. Column 1 reproduces the main results.
All specifications include dummies for birth order, birth month, birth year, and child age,
including primary sampling unit (PSU) mixed effects. The PSU is defined as a village for
rural areas and a census block for urban areas. Columns 2 and 3 specifications do not include
controls for the number of newborns but includes a control for per capita household income
at the time of the survey. Panel A presents results similar to the original specification.
Panel B presents the results for the interaction of those born after death with years since



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix to Chapter 2
Table B.1: Top Ten School Feeding Programs
Country Reported or Estimated
Number of Beneficiaries(in
000’s)




United States 45,000 389
China 26,000 -
Japan 9,770 799





Notes: *Cost estimates for India were unavailable in the WFP study and
hence been obtained by dividing the total budget allocated for MDMS by the
reported number of beneficiaries. Source: State of School Feeding Worldwide,
2013. World Food Programme (WFP).
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Andhra Pradesh 2003 Madhya Pradesh 2003
Arunachal Pradesh 2004 Maharashtra 2003
Assam 2005 Manipur 2004
Bihar 2005 Meghalaya 2003
Chhattisgarh 2002 Orissa 2004
Delhi 2003 Punjab 2003
Gujarat 1984 Rajasthan 2002
Haryana 2004 Sikkim 2002
Himachal Pradesh 2004 Tamil Nadu 1982
Jammu and Kashmir 2004 Tripura 2003
Jharkhand 2003 Uttar Pradesh 2004
Karnataka 2003 Uttaranchal 2003
Notes: The second column contains the year when the midday meal scheme was
implemented with full coverage throughout the state, but for Assam, Bihar,
Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh, it shows the year when the mid-day meal was
launched in pilot districts; these dates were collected from state midday meal
scheme audit and budget reports. Note: As shown by the IHDS data, it is not
necessarily true that fully coverage mentioned in the budget reports translates
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